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The original understanding of the Constitution, I wrote not so
long ago, was forged not in the courts but in Congress and the
executive branch.'
That was true of the Federalist period, the first twelve years
under the new Constitution-a time of great constitutional con-
troversies involving such matters as the Bank of the United
States, the Jay Treaty, and the Alien and Sedition Acts and of
quaint and curious squabbles now largely forgotten: what to call
the president, whether he must accept a salary, how the vice
president signs a bill. Some of these disputes sound petty, but
even they helped to define what kind of country the United
States would be. All of them were initially, and many of them
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1. See DAVID P. CURRiE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PE-
RIOD, 1789-1801, at 296 (1997).
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finally, fought out in the executive and legislative branches.
The same was true of the years that followed, when Thomas
Jefferson was president.
Jefferson's inauguration was a significant victory for the new
system, a peaceful transfer of power from one political party to
another, which at the time was not to be taken for granted.2
"We are all Republicans," he said in his inaugural address, "we
are all Federalists."3 It was a breath of fresh air.
Jefferson's brave words, of course, did not put an end to con-
troversy. His presidency was another exciting time: the Burr
conspiracy, the embargo, the war against the Barbary pi-
rates-in which Jefferson, following Washington's example, took
a refreshingly narrow view of the president's powers as com-
mander in chief.4 The Twelfth Amendment, designed with the
simple goal of avoiding the near disaster of the 1800 election,
proved to be a surprising can of worms, a monument to the diffi-
culty of constitutional drafting.5 In the great Court fight of
Jefferson's first term, which rivaled that of the 1930s, judicial
independence suffered grave setbacks in the repeal of the Judi-
ciary Act and the removal of Judge Pickering, only to emerge
more firmly entrenched than ever after the dramatic acquittal of
Justice Samuel Chase.6
Jefferson's presidency was also a time of significant events in
westward expansion: the admission of Ohio, the Louisiana Pur-
chase, and the beginnings of the Cumberland Road. Each of
these events raised fundamental constitutional questions. Each
was extensively debated in Congress and in the executive
branch, not in the courts. And each served as an important pre-
cedent when similar issues arose again.
2. See id. at 288-94.
3. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 11, 1801), in 1 MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 321, 322 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1897).
4. See MONTGOMERY N. KOSMA, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN THE TRIPOLITAN
WAR (forthcoming 1998).
5. See David P. Currie, The Twelfth Amendment, in UNINTENDED CONSE-
QUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS (David Kyvig ed., forthcoming 1998).
6. See David P. Currie, The Most Endangered Branch, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
(forthcoming 1998).
1442
JEFFERSON AND THE WEST
I. OHIO
The Northwest Ordinance contemplated the creation of three
to five new states in the territory ceded by individual states to
the Union after the Revolution.! As soon as any of the areas de-
fined in the Ordinance had sixty thousand free inhabitants it
was to be admitted to statehood, and Congress was directed to
admit it earlier if that was "consistent with the general interest
of the confederacy."8
Settlement of the Northwest was retarded, however, by hostile
Indians; the first western states admitted were Kentucky and
Tennessee.9 Then Mad Anthony Wayne defeated the Indians at
Fallen Timbers, Jay's Treaty dispersed their British protectors,
and Thomas Pinckney's treaty opened the Mississippi to western
goods."0 The population of the eastern part of the territory grew
by leaps and bounds, and it was separated from the remaining
portion, which was christened the "Indiana Territory," in
1800." By 1802 a number of its inhabitants were banging on
Congress's door in search of admission to the union."2
Although the 1800 census reported that the Eastern Division
had a population of only 45,365, a House committee recommend-
ed that its inhabitants be authorized "to form for themselves a
constitution and State government."" Congress obliged, 4 but
not without a little bloodletting on the House floor.
The problem was that not everyone in the division favored im-
mediate statehood. Governor Arthur St. Clair did not; the territo-
rial legislature did not; neither did the territorial delegate in Con-
gress, Paul Fearing. Neither did most Federalists in the House,
who perceived that the new state would vote Republican. 5
7. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. V, 1 Stat. 51, 53 n.(a) (amended 1789).
8. Id.; see CURRIE, supra note 1, at 103-07.
9. See CURRIE, supra note 1, at 100, 217-22. Vermont was also admitted to the
union, in 1791. See id. at 100-02.
10. See 1 BEVERLY W. BOND, JR., HISTORY OF THE STATE OF OHIO: THE FOUNDA-
TIONS OF OHIO 275-436 (1941); CURRIE, supra note 1, at 215; STANLEY ELKINs &
ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 436-40 (1993).
11. See Act of May 7, 1800, ch. 41, 2 Stat. 58 (amended 1804).
12. For petitions seeking statehood see 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 471, 814, 1017
(1802).
13. Id. at 1098.
14. See Act of Apr. 30, 1802, ch. 40, sec. 1, 2 Stat. 173.
15. See 1 BOND, supra note 10, at 449, 467-76. The territorial legislature had
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Fearing led off the debate with what he described as a consti-
tutional objection.'6 The resolution proposed that Congress pro-
vide for election of delegates to a convention that would decide
whether or not to pursue statehood and then, if the convention
decided to do so, would take the necessary steps.' v But Con-
gress, said Fearing, "had nothing to do with the arrangements
for calling a Convention."" There was nothing in the Ordinance
about it, and therefore the matter was left entirely to the territo-
ry; Congress could no more prescribe a constitutional convention
in a territory than in "any State in the Union."9
The comparison with a state was silly. "Was there ever a more
absurd doctrine," asked Joseph Nicholson of Maryland, than
"that States, acknowledged to be sovereign and independent,
should be compared to a Territory dependent upon the General
Government?"" Congress, he did not have to add, had express
gone so far as to pass a law inviting Congress to redivide the original Northwest
Territory into three rather than two parts, with the evident intention of preventing
the existence of any single area with a population large enough to qualify for state-
hood. See Act of Dec. 21, 1801, ch. 160, 1 STATUTES OF OHIO AND NORTHWESTERN
TERRITORY 341-42 (Chase 1833). The House voted 81-5 to disapprove this proposal.
See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 466 (1802); 1 BOND, supra note 10, at 467-70. The form of
the House resolution in this matter is puzzling: "Resolved, . . .that the act passed
by the Legislature for the Territory . . . ought not to be assented to by Congress."
11 ANNALS OF CONG. 466 (1802). Though acts of the Governor and judges in the
first stage of territorial government were subject to congressional veto under the
Northwest Ordinance, acts of the second-stage legislature, which first met in 1799,
did not appear to be. See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 51, 51-52 n.(a)
(amended 1789). Nor was there any report of Senate disapproval, or of presentation
of a disapproval order to the president, which Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution
would presumably require. Moreover, by November 1801, when the territorial legisla-
ture met, it had no further authority over matters affecting the Indiana Territory,
which would have had to be divided under its proposal. See Act of May 7, 1800, ch.
41, § 5, 2 Stat. 58, 59. The only plausible explanation is that the House was merely
declining to initiate legislation of its own to reconfigure the territory, the peculiar
phrasing of the resolution may have been prompted by the fact that the territorial
statute had purported to redefine the boundaries "as soon as the congress of the
United States shall declare their assent thereto." Ch. 160, § 1, 1 STATUTES OF OHIO
AND NORTHWESTERN TERRTORY at 342.
16. See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1103 (1802).
17. See id. at 1099.
18. Id. at 1103.
19. Id.; see also id. at 1104-05, 1115-16 (stating the similar positions of Rep.
Roger Griswold and Rep. Goddard).
20. Id. at 1105.
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authority to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States";2' it had no such authority over the states."
Nor should there have been any doubt of congressional au-
thority to provide for a convention to determine whether or not
to apply for statehood. As Massachusetts Representative John
Bacon said, Article IV, Section 3 empowered Congress to admit
new states; prescribing a means of ascertaining whether the peo-
ple wanted statehood was necessary and proper to admission.'
Roger Griswold of Connecticut went so far as to deny that the
Constitution could alter the Ordinance without territorial con-
sent,24 but there was little to say for that. The Constitution was
an avowedly revolutionary document, based on ultimate popular
sovereignty and expressly designed to do away with existing law
without conforming to its requirements for change.' If it could
sweep away the Articles of Confederation, as everyone agreed it
had done,26 then it could sweep away the Ordinance too.
21. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
22. Griswold's suggestion that Congress had no power to interfere with the "in-
ternal concerns" of the territory, 11 ANNALS OF CONG. at 1104 (1802), was reminis-
cent of the position taken by dissident colonists as to the powers of Parliament be-
fore the Revolution. See ANDREW C. McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 85 (1935); 1 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 68-69 (1774). This sugges-
tion had no more to recommend it than its predecessor; there is no hint of any such
limitation in Article IV.
23. See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1111-12 (1802). Griswold's argument that only the
territorial legislature could consent to a convention seemed to suggest that Congress
had no right to admit a new state against the wishes of its inhabitants. See id. at
1113. Certainly one thinks of admission as a consensual process. It had always been
so in the past, although there is no explicit requirement to that effect in Article IV.
Yet Representative Davis, relying on the provision in the Ordinance prescribing that
a territory "shall be admitted" upon attaining a population of 60,000, went so far as
to declare that Congress could admit a state without its consent. See id. at 1104.
24. The people of the Territory never consented to [the Constitution]; nor
are they bound by any part of it which gives more power to the Fed-
eral Legislature than it [is given] by the compact. Their rights, under
the compact, cannot be taken away by any provisions of the Consti-
tution, to which they were not a party.
Id. at 1112.
25. See the remarks of James Wilson in the Convention: "We must... go to
the original powers of Society, The House on fire must be extinguished, without a
scrupulous regard to ordinary rights." 2 MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDER-
AL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 469 (rev. ed., 1937).
26. See, e.g., WILLiAm RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
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Whether the Constitution had done so was another matter.
Article VI, to be sure, made the Constitution, and not the Ordi-
nance, the "supreme Law of the Land."" That the same Article
preserved the validity of the Ordinance as a preexisting "engage-
ment" did not give it constitutional rank; that this clause meant
constitutional provisions should be construed to respect the
Ordinance in cases of doubt was a better argument that
Griswold did not make.2" In any event there was important pre-
cedent for the view that, as Bacon implied, the Constitution did
not leave the Ordinance wholly unaltered. The new Congress, in
one of its first acts, passed a statute that brought the Ordinance
into conformity with the Constitution.29
Fearing buttressed his argument against congressional au-
thority to prescribe a convention by insisting that the Ordinance
did not require that the territory adopt a constitution in order to
become a state."0 The territory was thus "at liberty to form, or
not to form, a constitution,"3' and thus there was no basis for
requiring a convention to adopt one.
STATES OF AMERICA 29 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1829).
27. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
28. See CURRIE, supra note 1, at 218-21 (discussing the argument that Congress
was required to admit Tennessee).
29. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50-51 (amended 1800); CURRIE, supra
note 1, at 106. It would not be long before Congress was bombarded with petitions
from Governor William Henry Harrison asking that it suspend the Ordinance's ban
on slavery in the Indiana Territory. See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. VI, 1
Stat. 51, 53 n.(a) (amended 1789); 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 375 (1807). House and Sen-
ate committees in the Eighth and Ninth Congresses recommended that the petitions
be granted, arguing (honest!) that no issue of freedom was involved; because there
already were slaves elsewhere, it was only a question of where they would live. See
16 ANNALS OF CONG. 375, 482 (1807); 15 id. at 466 (1806); id. at 293 (1805); 13 id.
at 1023 (1804). Neither the House nor the Senate was ever persuaded, however, and
in the Tenth Congress a Senate committee finally recommended against relaxing the
ban after hearing from outraged settlers who had gone to Indiana to escape slavery.
No one was reported to have doubted Congress's power to modify the Ordinance dur-
ing these proceedings. See 17 id. at 23-31 (1807). But that power was doubted when
proposals were made to democratize the government of the Mississippi Territory,
though other members rightly pointed out that only the rights provisions (including,
of course, the slavery ban), and not the entire Ordinance, were designated as a
"compact" binding on Congress. See 16 id. at 333-34, 374-75; 19 id. at 492-510
(1808).
30. See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. at 1103 (1802).
31. Id. at 1118.
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Nicholson denied that the resolution would require the terri-
tory to adopt a constitution, 2 and he was right. The resolution
did seem to say, however, that the territory could not become a
state without doing so; Fearing's argument raised the important
question whether Congress could make adoption of a constitu-
tion a condition of statehood."
This was not the only condition the resolution imposed. Au-
thority to form a constitution and state government was subject
to the proviso that "the same" be republican and consistent with
both the Ordinance and the Constitution.34
No one questioned this proviso, except to the extent it re-
quired adoption of a written constitution. It would have been
hard to do so, because the proviso required nothing the territory
was not already required to do. The Ordinance itself specified
that new states be republican and conform to its principles.35
The Supremacy Clause made clear that the state government
had to comport with the Constitution, and Article IV reinforced
the requirement that it be republican. 6 It could hardly be un-
constitutional for Congress to insist that the new state satisfy
the requirements laid down by preexisting law. To ensure that
the new state really did adopt a republican form of government,
it was surely necessary and proper to make it an additional con-
dition of admission that the form of government be put into
writing and made binding as a matter of state law.
The committee also urged that Congress make certain
"propositions" that the new state was at liberty to accept or re-
fuse, "without any condition or restraint whatever."" If the
state would agree to exempt land sold by the United States from
taxes for ten years, Congress would grant the state three things:
certain salt springs "for the use of the people"; one section of
32. See id. at 1106.
33. See id. at 1103.
34. See i&. at 1098.
35. See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. V, 1 Stat. 51, 53 n.(a) (amended
1789). ,
36. See U.S. CONST. art. VI; id. art. IV, § 4. Indeed, the language of the En-
abling Act respecting adoption of a state constitution was copied directly from the
Ordinance; if the statute required a written constitution, so did the Ordinance itself.
See Act of Apr. 30, 1802, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 173 (amended 1803).
37. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1100 (1802).
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each township "for the use of schools"; and one tenth of the net
proceeds of local land sales to build roads "leading from the
navigable waters emptying into the Atlantic, to the Ohio," and
through the state itself."5
Adopted with minor modifications, 9 this was a provision of
transcendent importance. It was the beginning of federal sup-
port for internal improvements and schools.
4
Federal authority to construct roads and canals would soon be-
come a major issue of states' rights. Presidents Madison and Mon-
roe would both veto internal improvement bills on constitutional
grounds4 ----the latter, indeed, in the context of the very highway
to Ohio contemplated by the 1802 provision.42 One of the few chang-
es made when the self-styled Confederate States ofnAmerica adopt-
ed their own version of the Constitution was to forbid the central
government to support internal improvements.43
The House committee that advocated this momentous step in
1802 did not even advert to the constitutional question. It did note
that a 1785 ordinance had already reserved the same sections for
school purposes and added that intercourse between East and
West was crucial "to the stability and permanence of the union";4
the committee did not think it necessary to defend the constitu-
tionality of its proposal. Nor did opponents raise constitutional
doubts. Not surprisingly, Fearing thought it would be better to
38. Id.
39. Federal contributions for roads were reduced to five percent of the proceeds
of local land sales, and the tax exemption was reduced to five years. See ch. 40, § 7,
2 Stat. 175.
40. See 1 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING
THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 302 (Charles Scribner's Sons
1917) (1889). For an excellent summary of the improvements controversy from its
beginnings through the administration of John Quincy Adams, see LEONARD D.
WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, ch. 31 (1951).
41. See James Madison, Veto Message to the House of Representatives (Mar. 3,
1817), in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 3, at 584; see
also infra note 42 (citing President Monroe's veto).
42. See James Monroe, Veto Message to the House of Representatives (May 4,
1822), in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 3, at 142; see
also Letter from James Monroe to the House of Representatives (May 4, 1822), in 2
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 3, at 144 (discussing
Monroe's views on the constitutionality of internal improvement).
43. See CONST. OF THE CONFEDERATE STS. OF AM. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
44. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. at 1100 (1802).
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spend the entire amount for roads within the new state;45 he had
no objection to taking the money. Griswold griped that it was inap-
propriate to use funds earmarked for discharging the national
debt to build roads for the benefit of Pennsylvania and Virginia;
46
but he did not say it was unconstitutional.
William Giles of Virginia responded that local projects often
produced national benefits, as in the case of lighthouses, which
Congress had authorized before.' He felt no need to explain
why the proposal was within Congress's power, but his argu-
ment seemed to suggest two possible sources of authority: the
Commerce Clause and the General Welfare Clause.4
Giles was not one to construe the welfare provision broadly;
he had been loud in insisting that Congress had no right to help
the victims of the great Savannah fire.49 Despite the lighthouse
analogy, other Republicans would soon deny that the commerce
power reached so far as to permit Congress to build roads or
canals.5 What then explains the conspicuous indifference of the
1802 Congress to the constitutional question?
It seems likely that both supporters and opponents of the
Ohio Enabling Act5' assumed that the three proposed grants
fell within the authority Article IV gave Congress to dispose of
the property of the United States.52
Congress had granted great gobs of public lands since the be-
ginning.3 It had conveyed lots to war veterans in recognition of
45. See id. at 1125.
46. See id. at 1124.
47. See id.; CURRIE, supra note 1, at 69-70.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, ci. 3.
49. See CURRIE, supra note 1, at 224. Faithful to the narrow conception of the
spending power they had enunciated in the Savannah case, Republicans in the Jef-
fersonian Congress limited the relief they provided to victims of subsequent blazes in
Norfolk and Portsmouth to a year's extension of the time for discharging customs
obligations, presumably pursuant to the power to collect taxes. See Act of Mar. 19,
1804, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 272; 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 1252 (1807); cf CURRIE, supra note
1, at 168-69 (discussing an earlier tax rebate afforded as a means of subsidizing the
cod fisheries).
50. See, e.g., James Madison, Veto Message to the House of Representatives
(Mar. 3, 1817), in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 3, at
584.
51. Act of Apr. 30, 1802, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 173 (amended 1803).
52. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
53. See CURRIE, supra note 1, at 207 nn.5-7.
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their services, it had transferred acres to Indians and others the
federal government had displaced from their homes, and it had
set up a land office to sell off the public domain to speculators
and settlers.54 As Article IV made clear, Congress was supposed
to get rid of its title to public lands." Nothing in that provision
limited the purposes for which land could be conveyed. Nothing
required that the government receive anything in return, al-
though it did in this case: To qualify for the proffered goodies,
the new state would have to give purchasers of federal land a
tax exemption for ten years.56
Can it really be that simple? The first source of uncertainty is
that the proposal was not to transfer land to the state so that it
could build roads, but to set aside a fraction of the proceeds of
land sales so that Congress could build them. Federal money is,
of course, federal property, but that proves too much; surely the
limitations on the power to tax and spend for the general wel-
fare that Republicans had so vociferously proclaimed cannot be
annihilated simply by regarding tax revenues as "property" of
which Congress is authorized to dispose.
Perhaps a tracing principle is in order. If Congress can give
land away for purposes of internal improvements, it can give
away the proceeds of land sales for the same purpose. It should
not matter in terms of states' rights whether the land is sold
before or after it is transferred. This argument, however, high-
lights a basic difficulty with the original assumption that Con-
gress is free to subsidize improvements with donations of public
land. For it would seem most peculiar for the Framers to limit
federal spending to that which is incident to the exercise of its
enumerated powers, as Madison contended,57 and at the same
time to permit this restriction to be circumvented by the simple
expedient of substituting land for money. Maybe the power to
dispose of property was only the power to sell it after all.58
54. See id. at 207 nn.5-6.
55. "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of ... the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States... ." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
56. See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1100 (1802).
57. See CURRIE, supra note 1, at 79, 169.
58. It might also be argued that roadbuilding by the federal government was a
far cry from merely disposing of federal property, even if there were no restrictions
on the disposition itself. Related concerns were to inform Monroe's later veto of a
1450
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The proposed exchange of land and its proceeds for a tax
break that increased the value of other federal lands thus raised
fundamental questions of constitutional authority that Congress
did not even begin to discuss. It did not, however, raise addition-
al issues respecting Congress's power to impose conditions on
the admission of new states, for, as the committee emphasized,
the exchange was not made a condition of statehood; it was a
separate offer the new state was free to accept or refuse.59
The committee phrased it that way deliberately in order to
ensure its constitutionality. For Treasury Secretary Albert
Gallatin, who had proposed the bargain, had expressly disputed
Congress's authority to impose additional conditions on the ad-
mission of states:
[I]t does not appear to me that the United States have a
right to annex new conditions, not implied in the articles of
compact, limiting the Legislative right of taxation of the Ter-
ritory or new State. The limitations, which they may rightful-
ly impose, are designated by the articles themselves, and
these being unalterable unless by common consent, all Legis-
lative powers, which of right pertain to an independent State,
must be exercised at the discretion of the Legislature of the
new State, unless limited either by the articles or the Consti-
tution of the United States or of the State.0
Gallatin did not say that additional conditions would violate
the Constitution itself; like Fearing, who argued that Congress
could not prescribe a constitutional convention, he appeared to
view the Ordinance as binding on Congress. That was what the
Ordinance said,6' and the Constitution made it as valid as ev-
er.62 Perhaps the best explanation was that, as Representative
Giles said, the Ordinance was like a treaty.' It might not be
bill to collect tolls for maintenance of the Cumberland Road. See Veto Message of
James Monroe (May 4, 1822), in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1817-
1833, supra note 3, at 142.
59. See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1100 (1802).
60. Id. at 1101.
61. See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 51, 52 n.(a) (amended 1789).
62. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
63. See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1103 (1802).
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unconstitutional for Congress to violate the Ordinance, but it
would be a breach of faith; no one in the House argued that
Congress had a "right" to disregard what the Ordinance de-
scribed as a "compact between the original states and the people
and states in the said territory." '
If this view was correct, Congress was not only within its
rights in conditioning Ohio's admission on adoption of a republi-
can form of government and conformity with the Ordinance; it
was required to do so, as both of these conditions were pre-
scribed by the "compact" itself.' And on this view the
resolution's further provision that the new state would be admit-
ted on "the same footing with the original States"66 was not an
act of grace either, for that too was in substance what the com-
pact prescribed.67
The question of Congress's power to impose conditions on ad-
mission arose in yet another context in connection with the
boundaries of the proposed new state. The original Northwest
Territory had already been divided into east and west sections
for statehood purposes along the present line between Ohio and
Indiana." But the two sections extended northward through
what is now Michigan to the Canadian border, and the commit-
tee proposed to amputate the new state at a line extending east-
ward from the southern tip of Lake Michigan.69 That is what
Congress ultimately did; the committee's line was essentially the
present boundary between Ohio and Michigan.
After losing in their effort to block the resolution permitting
immediate statehood, Federalists attacked the boundary provi-
sion. It was unfair to the inhabitants in the Detroit area, said
James Bayard of Delaware, to exclude them from the new state;
they would have to travel many miles to reach their new seat of
government in the Indiana Territory, and it was undemocratic to
64. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. at 52 n.(a).
65. See id. at 53 n.(a).
66. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1098 (1802).
67. See Northwest Ordinance, art. V, 1 Stat. at 53 n.(a).
68. See Act of May 7, 1800, ch. 41, § 5, 2 Stat. 58-59 (amended 1801). This was
the same statute that created the Indiana Territory, whose boundary differed slightly
from that prescribed for the future state. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
69. See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1098-99 (1802).
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return them to the autocratic first stage of territorial govern-
ment after they had enjoyed the benefits of an elected assembly
in the Eastern Division.70 He accordingly proposed that the res-
olution be amended to include the northern part of the division
in the new state, reserving to Congress "the right of making one
or more States in said State at any future time."v"
Once Congress admitted the new state, Pennsylvania's John
Smilie replied, it would be too late to divide it;72 for Article IV
forbade the creation of one state within another without the
latter's consent.73 The Constitution, said Bayard, was irrele-
vant; the new states were to be admitted under the Ordinance,
not under the Constitution.7 Moreover, the greater power em-
braced the lesser: "If you are vested with the greater power of
admitting, you have certainly the minor powers included in the
greater power." 5 It was thus wrong to argue "that Congress
has only a right to admit, without any reservation."7" Congress
could perfectly well say it would "not now exercise the whole
power committed to [it], but reserve[d] the right of exercising it
hereafter."77 In other words, Congress could condition admis-
sion of a state on the possibility of dividing it in the future. 7
70. See id. at 1120-21. Fearing even questioned Congress's authority to exclude
the northern portion of the division: The Ordinance did not permit Congress, without
territorial consent, to admit one part of a division without admitting the other. See
id. at 1120. Giles replied that the committee proposal was in full accord with the
Ordinance; for while Congress in admitting part of the division as one state was
obliged to form the remainder into another, it had discretion to determine when the
latter should be admitted. See id. Giles seems to have had the better of this argu-
ment on the basis of the relevant text.
71. Id. at 1122.
72. See d. at 1123.
73. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. Bacon contended that the state could not sur-
render its power over the northern territory even if it wanted to. See 11 ANNALS OF
CONG. 1123 (1802). The same argument was made, without much effect, against a
proposal to disestablish the District of Columbia. See 12 id. at 490 (1803) (statement
of Rep. Dennis). It was even less convincing here. Virginia had ceded not only her
half of the District for the seat of government, but also Kentucky (and the North-
west Territory itself) for the formation of new states. Article I expressly contemplat-
ed the first of these cessions, as Article IV expressly contemplated the second.
74. See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1123 (1802).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. The committee report, see id. at 1099, and the statute as adopted, see Act of
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Bayard's remarks underline once again the broad consensus
that the Ordinance, and not the Constitution, governed
Congress's authority with respect to the admission of Ohio. That
is a queer enough perception at best to modern eyes. But this
time there was a difference. It was one thing to argue, as Fear-
ing and Gallatin did, that the Ordinance precluded Congress
from doing what the Constitution alone might allow. It was
quite another to contend that the Ordinance permitted Congress
to do what the Constitution expressly forbade. Thus, to the mod-
ern observer, Bayard's position stands or falls with the compati-
bility of conditional admission with the statehood provisions of
Article IV.
That question would soon be vigorously aired when it was pro-
posed to admit additional states. The constitutional question
was not explored in the Ohio debates, where all the participants
believed the Ordinance rather than the Constitution governed.
This is not the time to consider it in depth; we shall have ample
occasion to do so later. But it may not be amiss to point out at
this juncture that as early as 1791 Bayard's predecessor, John
Vining, had denied that the power not to hire a tax collector in-
cluded the power to forbid those who were hired to engage in po-
litical activities. 9 Others had denied that the power to refuse
citizenship included the power to condition it on renunciation of
titles or slaves.8" As every modern student knows, the greater
Apr. 30, 1802, ch. 40, § 2, 2 Stat. 173 (amended 1803), reversed the burden: Con-
gress reserved the right to attach the northern part of the Division to the new
state. This provision raised the question whether Congress had power to enlarge a
state without its consent. Article IV does not directly address this issue. Later deci-
sions limiting federal authority on the basis of implicit state autonomy, however,
suggest a negative answer. Cf Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (hold-
ing unconstitutional a federal requirement that state officers perform background
checks on potential handgun buyers); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding
that a state could not be sued in federal court by one of its citizens); Collector v.
Day, 78 U.S. 113 (1871) (holding that Congress could not tax the salary of a state
judicial officer). If this conclusion is correct, the committee's version posed the same
question of unconstitutional conditions as Bayard's opposite proposal. Congress never
attempted to exercise this option, however, as Michigan was made a separate territo-
ry in 1805. See Act of Jan. 11, 1805, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 309; see also Act of Feb. 3, 1809,
ch. 13, § 1, 2 Stat. 514, 514-15 (amended 1812) (creating a separate Illinois Territo-
ry in that portion of Indiana west of the Wabash River).
79. See CURRIE, supra note 1, at 62.
80. See id. at 194-95.
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power does not always include the lesser.
Congress enacted the committee's recommendations almost
word for word, the territorial convention adopted a constitution
and erected the new state's government. 1 In February 1803
Congress passed a second law reciting these facts, declaring that
Ohio "has become" a state, and making existing federal laws ap-
plicable within its borders." The first statute had authorized
Ohio to form a state government, the second recognized that it
was already a state. Congress never passed an act admitting
Ohio to the Union.'
One last controversy attended Ohio's admission. Near the end
of December 1802, after the territorial convention had completed
its work, Representative Davis questioned Fearing's right to con-
tinue to serve as Delegate from the Northwest Territory. That
81. See Act of Apr. 30, 1802, ch. 40, 2 Stat 173 (amended 1803). The statute
spelled out the procedure for electing convention delegates, omitted the superfluous
requirement that the new government be consistent with the Constitution, awarded
the state a single representative until the next census, reduced the road fund to five
percent of the land proceeds and the period of tax exemption to five years, and at-
tached the excluded northern part of the division to the Indiana Territory. See id.
82. Act of Feb. 19, 1803, ch. 7, 2 Stat. 201. The new state constitution, which
gave the state its name, set up a government unquestionably republican. It also
faithfully incorporated most of the Ordinance's requirements, including such matters
as habeas corpus, OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 12, freedom of religion, id. § 3,
protection of property, id. § 4, and contracts, id. § 16, and the prohibition of slavery,
id. § 2. The Ohio constitution appended a number of additional rights the Ordinance
had omitted, such as freedom of speech, id. § 6, press, id., assembly, id. § 19, peti-
tion, id., right to counsel, id. § 11, to a speedy public trial, id. § 7, protection from
double jeopardy, id. § 11, self-incrimination, id., general warrants, id. § 5, and "un-
warrantable" searches or seizures, id. The failure to repeat the Ordinance's law of
the land provision, exemption of federal lands from taxation, and freedom of naviga-
tion raised the question whether the Ordinance itself remained enforceable alter
statehood, as the Ordinance seemed to say. The same question would be presented if
the state ever failed to enforce the provisions the Ordinance had required it to en-
act. There is no evidence that Congress ever determined whether the provisions of
this constitution met the requirements laid down in the Enabling Act, as one would
expect it to do, before announcing that Ohio had become a state.
83. As a result there are five different theories as to when Ohio became a state; the
state legislature said it was on the date the legislature first met. See 2 WILIAM T. UTTER,
HISTORY OF THE STATE OF OHIO: THE FRONTIER STATE 31 (1942) (describing the suggested
dates and the legislature's solution). The Enabling Act had ambiguously said that "the said
state, when formed, shall be admitted into the Union." Enabling Act, ch. 40, § 1, 2 Stat. 173
(1802) (amended 1803). Use of the passive voice appeared to envision further action by
Congress, which was not forthcoming..
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territory ceased to exist when Ohio became a state, argued Da-
vis, and Ohio had not elected Fearing as its representative.' A
committee found that Fearing was still entitled to his seat, and
the House took no further action.85 Fearing served until the ses-
sion ended, although by that time Congress had formally ac-
knowledged that Ohio was a state. The committee may have
shared the state legislature's view that until the legislature met
Ohio was not a state,86 but that cannot explain the House's sub-
sequent inaction. Perhaps there was a tacit agreement not to
deprive the new state of a voice on the basis of a technicality.
Perhaps it was thought that, as William Smith had argued in
support of the statute authorizing a delegate from the Southwest
Territory, the House could permit anyone it liked to participate,
short of voting, in its proceedings.87 Or perhaps in the end-of-
the-session rush no one remembered that there was a problem.
Oh, yes. Ohio did vote Republican: For Governor, for the legis-
lature, and for Congress. There hadn't been many Federalists
there to begin with, and their selfish opposition to statehood did
them in entirely.88
II. LOUISIANA
It was too good to be true. In order to ensure an unimpeded
outlet for the products of the western states, President Jefferson
authorized Robert Livingston and James Monroe to buy New
Orleans and the Floridas from France, 9 and Napoleon offered
them the whole Mississippi basin. Like any good agent, they
eagerly exceeded their instructions and signed on the dotted
line, confident that their principal would ratify their actions."
84. See 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 295 (1802). The state constitution had sensibly and
optimistically provided that all territorial officers should continue to exercise their
duties until new officers replaced them, but the federal Constitution set the require-
ments for state representation in Congress. See Ohio Const. of 1802, Sched., § 3;
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2.
85. See 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 447 (1803).
86. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
87. See CURRIE, supra note 1, at 202-03.
88. See 2 UTrER, supra note 83, at 26-27.
89. See 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 1095-108 (1803) (reproducing a letter from Madison
to Livingston and Monroe dated Mar. 2, 1803).
90. See id. at 1145. For the argument that the enlarged purchase fell within the
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As noted in the preceding section, free navigation of the Mis-
sissippi, together with the ancillary right to deposit goods at
New Orleans pending transfer to ocean-going vessels, was guar-
anteed by Thomas Pinckney's 1795 treaty with Spain,"1 which
had acquired the capacious province of Louisiana from France at
the close of the Seven Years' War. In 1800, however, Spain
agreed to cede Louisiana back to France," and a year later
Spanish authorities in New Orleans suspended the right of de-
posit in evident violation of the treaty.93 These events brought
home the precariousness of permitting the lifeblood of the west-
ern economy to depend upon promises on a piece of paper.94
Federalists rattled their sabres and called for military seizure
of New Orleans.95 Instead, Congress appropriated two million
envoys' authority to negotiate for the "more effective security of the rights and inter-
ests of the United States in the River Mississippi and in the territories eastward
thereof," see 4 IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: SECRETARY OF STATE 1800-1809, at
107 (1953) (quoting an unpublished power of attorney).
91. See Treaty of Friendship, Limits and Navigation, Between the United States
of America and the King of Spain, Oct. 27, 1795, art. 4 & 22, 8 Stat. 138, 140, 152.
92. See 1 ADAMS, supra note 40, at 403.
93. See id. at 420.
94. By 1800, once-mighty Spain was a pushover and France a superpower.
Gouverneur Morris thought it likely France would not respect the treaty between
the United States and Spain. See 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 191 (1803). "The day that
France takes possession of New Orleans," wrote Jefferson (Jefferson!), "we must mar-
ry ourselves to the British fleet." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Robert Livingston
(Apr. 18, 1802), in JEFFERSON'S LETTERS, at 208 (Willson Whitman ed., 1940). For
further information, see Jefferson's Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 15,
1802), in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 3, at 343;
Jefferson's Message to the Senate Respecting the Appointments of Livingston and
Monroe, in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 3, at 350-51
and the House committee report recommending appropriations, 12 ANNALS OF CONG.
371-74 (1803).
95. See 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 83-88, 91-96 (1803) (statement of Sen. Ross); id. at
107-15 (statement of Sen. White); id. at 136-39 (statement of Sen. Dayton); id. at
142-46 (statement of Sen. J. Mason); id. at 153-57 (statement of Sen. Wells); id. at
185-206 (statement of Sen. Morris). Ross's proposed resolutions, see 12 ANNALS OF
CONG. at 95-96, would have authorized the president not only to take possession of
New Orleans and adjacent territories, but also to employ the militia for that pur-
pose. But as Virginia's Stevens Mason observed Article I, Section 8 permitted the
militia to be used only "to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections
and repel Invasions." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; see 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 216
(1803). (Mason later stated, with the support of Senator Nicholas, see id. at 236-37,
that Congress could not constitutionally delegate to the president its authority to
declare war. See id. at 225.) On Breckinridge's motion the House voted instead to
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dollars to purchase the strategic territories. 6 Then Napoleon
made the offer Jefferson's envoys had no authority to accept and
could not in good conscience refuse.97
By the first article of the new 1803 treaty,98 France ceded to
the United States "the colony or province of Louisiana, with the
same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it
had when France possessed it"99-declaring that France had
acquired "an incontestable title to the domain" pursuant to its
1800 treaty.0 0 Article III provided what the United States
authorize the president to hold up to 80,000 militiamen in readiness in case they
were needed-presumably for purposes the Constitution allowed. See id. at 119, 255-
56. For the resulting statute, see Act of Mar. 3, 1803, ch. 32, 2 Stat. 241 (repealed
1806).
96. See Act of Feb. 26, 1803, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 202. West Florida was included be-
cause the mouths of the Mobile and Appalachicola -Rivers, the Mississippi Territory's
avenues to the sea, lay within its borders. The case for acquisition of East Florida
(the present state of that name), was admittedly less urgent. It would facilitate
trade with the West Indies, "would likewise make our whole territory compact,
would add considerably to our seacoast, and by giving us the Gulf of Mexico for our
southern boundary, would render us less liable to attack, in what is now deemed
the most vulnerable part of the Union." 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 373 (1803).
97. For a streamlined account of these events, see MARSHALL SMELSER, THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, 1801-1815, at 83-103 (1968). For more detailed depictions,
see 1 ADAMS, supra note 40, at 227-392; 4 BRANT, supra note 90, at 98-159; GEORGE
DANGERFIELD, CHANCELLOR ROBERT LIVINGSTON OF NEW YORK 307-94 (1960); ALEX-
ANDER DECONDE, THIS AFFAIR OF LOUISIANA (1976); 4 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON
THE PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM, 1801-1805, at 239-363 (1970); ARTHUR PRESTON
WHITAKER, THE MISSISSIPPI QUESTION, 1795-1803 (1934).
98. Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic, Apr.
30, 1803, art. I, 8 Stat. 200, 200-02 [hereinafter Louisiana Treaty].
99. Id. at 202. The boundaries of this grant were later to give rise to serious
disputes with Spain, not least over East and West Florida, which included the Gulf
Coast westward to the Mississippi. See 1 ADAMS, supra note 40, at 347-51; 4
MALONE, supra note 97, at 303-09 and authorities cited; SMELSER, supra note 97, at
96, 104-08.
100. Louisiana Treaty, supra note 98, art. I, 8 Stat. at 202. In opposing the pur-
chase, Senator Plumer made much of the fact that the 1800 agreement did not itself
transfer the territory back to France, but only promised that Spain would do so af-
ter certain conditions were met, arguing-as the Spanish minister had protest-
ed-that it was not clear France had any right to sell. See WILLIAM PLUMER'S MEM-
ORANDUM OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, 1803-1807, at 4 (Everett
S. Brown ed., Da Capo Press 1969) (1923) [hereafter PLUMERI; see also 13 ANNALS
OF CONG. 32-33 (1803) (statement of Sen. White) (opposing a bill to appropriate
money for the purchase price because it was doubtful whether Spain would transfer
possession). Jackson and Adams sensibly replied that the money would not be paid
until we took possession, and the bill was passed. See id. at 40, 66; see also infra
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would do with Louisiana after acquiring it:
The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated
in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as
possible, according to the principles of the Federal constitu-
tion, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and im-
munities of citizens of the United States; and in the mean
time they shall be maintained and protected in the free en-
joyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they
profess.01
Article VII provided certain privileges for Spanish and French
vessels that were to raise troublesome constitutional ques-
tions.0 2 The greatest controversy, however, would surround
Article III's requirement that Louisiana be "incorporated in the
Union of the United States."' °'
note 112 and accompanying text (discussing subsequent appropriations bills).
101. Louisiana Treaty, supra note 98, art. I1, 8 Stat. at 202.
102. See id. at 204; see also infra notes 189-207 and accompanying text.
103. Louisiana Treaty, supra note 98, art. III, 8 Stat. at 202. There was some
flak about the citizenship provision as well. Representative Mitchill rightly stressed
that the treaty itself did not confer citizenship but only promised it in the future,
though he noted with much force that the Jay Treaty had authorized British sub-
jects who remained in the country to become citizens by simply taking an oath. See
13 ANNALS OF CoNG. 480-81 (1803). Plumer objected that admission to the Union
would naturalize all inhabitants en bloc without regard to the requirements other-
wise applicable by statute, in violation of Article I, Section 8, Clause 4, which em-
powered Congress to adopt only "an uniform rule" on the subject. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 4; see PLUMER, supra note 100, at 10. The purpose of this provision of the
Constitution was to preclude states with liberal views on immigration from inflicting
their ideas on other parts of the country. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States."). Even if the clause also forbids Congress generally to pass special
naturalization laws, but see FREDERICK VAN DYNE, CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED
STATES 235-37 (1904) (noting, inter alia, several instances respecting naturalization
of Indian tribes), it is difficult to apply the clause to preclude blanket naturalization
upon admission of a new state, given the original understanding that citizenship in
a state meant citizenship in the Union. See 2 RAWLE, supra note 26, at 86. As stat-
ed in Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 175-76 (1892):
So far as the original States were concerned, all those who were citizens
of such States became upon the formation of the Union citizens of the
United States, and upon the admission of Nebraska into the Union "upon
an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatsoever," the
citizens of what had been the Territory became citizens of the United
States and of the State.
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Jefferson had doubts about the constitutionality of the entire
enterprise. As he said in a letter to Kentucky Senator John
Breckinridge, "[tihe Constitution has made no provision for our
holding foreign territory, still less for incorporating foreign na-
tions into our Union," °4 as Article III of the treaty unequivo-
cally required. But Jefferson knew a good deal when he saw one,
and he had no intention of repudiating the treaty. He suggested
to Breckinridge that the Constitution be amended to remedy the
perceived want of power."
A few days later, on the strength of a letter from Livingston
warning that Napoleon might be looking for an excuse to weasel
out of the bargain, Jefferson urged Breckinridge to say nothing of
constitutional qualms. °6 Accordingly, there was no reference to
Plumer's additional argument that the treaty could not be performed because Louisi-
ana citizens would not be eligible for election to the presidency refutes itself. As his
own argument shows, presidential eligibility is not a privilege of mere citizenship.
See PLUMER, supra note 100, at 10; see also U.S. CONST. art. H, § 1 ("No person
except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the
adoption of this constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President.").
104. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckinridge (Aug. 12, 1803), in 10
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 7 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905). He had
written to John Dickinson to the same effect a few days before. See Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson (Aug. 9, 1803), in 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra, at 29.
105. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckinridge, supra note 104, at
7. Indeed he had already sent Robert Smith a draft amendment on the subject, see
Drafts of an Amendment to the Constitution (July 1803), in 10 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 104, at 3-12, Smith had responded with a second,
see Letter from Robert Smith to Thomas Jefferson (July 9, 1803), in 10 THE WORKS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 104, at 3-5 n.1, and Jefferson had sent Madison
and Attorney General Levi Lincoln a third. See Drafts of an Amendment to the Con-
stitution, supra, at 3-8; see also 12 ANNALS OF CONG. at 1166 (1803) (conveying the
president's "entire approbation" of his agents' unauthorized action).
Jefferson's first proposal would have "incorporated" Louisiana "with the United
States," given Congress a narrowly drafted list of specific powers over it, and autho-
rized establishment of a territorial government in the southern portion, reserving the
rest essentially for the settlement of Indians pending further amendment. See Drafts
of an Amendment to the Constitution, supra, at 3-12. Smith's revision preserved
Jefferson's basic principles but sensibly replaced the specific powers with general
authority "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations." Letter from
Robert Smith to Thomas Jefferson, supra, at 4-5 n.1. Jefferson's later draft simply
made Louisiana 'a part of the U S," and its inhabitants citizens, making similar
provision for Florida "whenever it may be rightfully obtained," and still declaring the
northern portion of Louisiana basically out of bounds. Drafts of an Amendment to
the Constitution, supra, at 3-8.
106. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckinridge (Aug. 18, 1803), in
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any constitutional question when the president called the treaty to
the attention of a special session of the Eighth Congress in October
1803,"07 when he asked the Senate to endorse it,' or when he
invited both Houses to implement it by legislation.0 9
The Senate approved the treaty within four days,"0 and
Congress passed a series of implementing statutes. The presi-
dent was authorized to take possession of the new province;"'
money was appropriated to pay for the purchase;" the tariff
laws and other federal statutes were extended to the new ter-
ritory."' The area was divided at the thirty-third parallel, the
northern boundary of the present state of Louisiana. The south-
ern portion, which contained the city of New Orleans, was chris-
tened the Territory of Orleans and the remainder the District
(later territory) of Louisiana." Each was ultimately given its
10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 104, at 7-8 n.1; see also Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 18, 1803), in 10 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 104, at 8 n.1 (informing Madison that the "less said"
of the constitutional difficulties "the better"). For Livingston's letter of June 3 to
Madison urging prompt action, see 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 1158 (1803). Livingston's
similar letter to the president is apparently unpublished. For the view that
Livingston's fears were self-serving "nonsense," see 4 BRANT, supra note 90, at 143.
107. See Jefferson's Third Annual Message to Congress (Oct. 17, 1803), in 1 MES-
SAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 3, at 357-58.
108. See Jefferson's Special Message to the Senate (Oct. 17, 1803), in 1 MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESDENTS, supra note 3, at 362.
109. See Jefferson's Special Message to Congress (Oct. 21, 1803), in 1 MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 3, at 362-63.
110. See 1 S. EXEC. J. 450 (1803).
111. See Act of Oct. 31, 1803, ch. 2, 2 Stat. 245 (amended 1804). Despite the
sound constitutional objections Republicans raised in Congress against an earlier at-
tempt to authorize employment of the militia to take possession of portions of Loui-
siana, see supra note 95, the administration apparently was prepared to do just
that. See 4 MALONE, supra note 97, at 335. But Louisiana now belonged to the
United States, and in helping to exercise their treaty right to occupation, the militia
could fairly be said to be executing federal law.
112. See ch. 2, 2 Stat. at 245; Act of Nov. 10, 1803, ch. 3, 2 Stat. 247. There
were two separate laws because some of the money was to be used to pay off debts
owed by France to United States citizens, in accord with two separate conventions
that accompanied the treaty. See Convention Between the United States of America
and the French Republic, Apr. 30, 1803, art. 1, 8 Stat. 206; Convention Between the
United States of America and the French Republic, Apr. 30, 1803, art. 1, 8 Stat.
208. The total sum, as you remember from elementary school, was $15,000,000.
113. See Act of Feb. 24, 1804, ch. 13, 2 Stat 251, 251-54.
114. See Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 38, 2 Stat. 283 (repealed 1805).
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own territorial government," 5 and Orleans received the prom-
ise of statehood the treaty arguably required."6 Congress ap-
propriated three thousand dollars for exploration of the new do-
main".7 and established a commission-not a court-to pass
upon claims to land within its boundaries."'
The Louisiana Purchase was a grand coup for the United
States. But it was not achieved without a fight. Yankee Federal-
ists, perceiving that westward expansion portended diminution
of their influence," 9 opposed it tooth and nail. While Jefferson
115. See Act of Mar. 2, 1805, ch. 23, 2 Stat 322; id. 2 Stat. 331 (repealed 1812).
As an initial stopgap measure, the northern district ("Louisiana") had previously
been administered by the governor and judges of the Indiana Territory. See ch. 38, §
12, 2 Stat 283, 287.
116. See ch. 23, 2 Stat. at 323. Following the model of the Northwest Ordinance,
Congress authorized the admission of Orleans "upon the footing of the original
states" once its population reached 60,000, provided its constitution was republican
and consistent with the Constitution and with the Ordinance itself, insofar as it ap-
plied. See id. Congress reserved the right to alter the boundaries before admission
so long as it did not thereby delay statehood. See id. These conditions, which did
not significantly go beyond those imposed with respect to Ohio, provoked no consti-
tutional debate. The additional statement that Orleans would be admitted "conform-
ably to the provisions of the third article of the treaty" was probably meant only to
show that by this act the United States would fulfill its obligation to France. Id.
The statute can scarcely have made treaty promises respecting the protection of lib-
erty, property, and religion a further condition of admission, because by the terms of
the treaty these promises respected only the period before the territory became a
state.
117. See Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 61, § 13, 2 Stat 303. No, this was not Lewis
and Clark's expedition. They had been sent on their way before Louisiana was ac-
quired, Jefferson having justified the expenditure as serving "the interests of com-
merce" because he saw no basis for financing a purely scientific investigation. Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Congress (Jan. 18, 1803), in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 3, at 354. The resultant act appropriated $2,500 "for
the purpose of extending the external commerce of the United States." Act of Feb.
28, 1803, ch. 12, 2 Stat. 206; see H.R. REP. No. 8-178 (1804), reprinted in 1 AMER-
CAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND ExECUTIVE, OF THE CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED STATES (MISCELLANEOUS) 390-91 (1834) [hereinafter AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS (MISC.)J (discussing the benefits to be gained from such an expedition and
recommending that the House of Representatives approve the appropriation); 4
MALONE, supra note 97, at 276. Contrast the First Congress's refusal, in the face of
constitutional doubts, to bankroll an exploration of Baflin's Bay and the magnetic
pole. See CURRIE, supra note 1, at 71-72.
118. See Act of Mar. 2, 1805, ch. 26, § 5, 2 Stat. 324, 327.
119. See, e.g., 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 58 (statement of Sen. Tracy); id. at 433
(statement of Rep. Griswold); EVERETT S. BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 1803-1812, at 32-33 (1920); PLUMER, supra note 100, at 9
("Admit this western world into the union, & you destroy with a single operation
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pocketed his constitutional concerns in order not to jeopardize
his dream, Federalist adversaries made his arguments against
him. The debate over approval and implementation of the Loui-
siana treaty, like so many others of the time, was in significant
part a debate over the meaning of the Constitution. 2 °
A. Acquisition and Admission
There was little time for constitutional debate when the treaty
itself was before the Senate; even New Hampshire Senator Wil-
liam Plumer, who kept the most complete record of Senate de-
bates at the time, recorded only his own unspoken reserva-
tions."2 But seven Federalists voted not to approve the
treaty, 2 and most of them renewed their objections when leg-
islation was proposed to carry it out." A valid treaty, they ar-
gued, was the law of the land and left no room for congressional
discretion, but this treaty was unconstitutional and thus could
not be implemented at all.'
But how could the Federalists-or Jefferson, for that mat-
ter-doubt the power to acquire Louisiana and to admit it to the
the whole weight & importance of the eastern states in the scale of politics.").
120. For a thorough study of the constitutional arguments that were made at the
time, see BROWN, supra note 119, at 14-35, 62-83.
121. See PLUMER, supra note 100, at 3-14.
122. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 308 (1803). Dayton voted for the treaty. See id.
Adams, who favored acquisition, had not yet arrived in Washington. See 4 MALONE,
supra note 97, at 328. Tracy voted against the treaty. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 308
(1803). Gouverneur Morris, who was no longer in the Senate, also supported the
purchase, though he thought it would be "injurious" to admit the new territory into
the Union. See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Jonathan Dayton (Jan. 7, 1804), in
2 THE DIARY AND LETrIRS OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, 452-53 (Anne Cary Morris ed.,
Da Capo Press 1970) (1888). So did Hamilton, who, when he thought Napoleon
would never sell, had urged conquest, and who still thought it would have been
preferable to acquire New Orleans alone. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, For the Evening
Post, in 26 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 82-85 (Harold C. Syrett ed.,
1979); ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Purchase of Louisiana, in 26 THE PAPERS OF ALEXAN-
DER HA ILTON, supra, 129-36.
123. See PLUMER, supra note 100, at 31. Plumer did not, concluding that he was
bound by the Senate's decision to approve the treaty. See id.
124. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 44, 431 (1803) (statements of Sen. Pickering and
Rep. Gaylord Griswold). The insistence that Congress was bound to implement a
valid treaty was in accord with the position Federalists had taken with respect to
appropriations under the Jay Treaty in 1795. See CURRIE, supra note 1, at 213.
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Union? The acquisition of territory had been the subject of trea-
ties since time immemorial, and Article II, Section 2 gave the
treaty power to the United States;125 Article IV, Section 3 ex-
plicitly empowered Congress to admit new states, 26 as it had
already done on several occasions.12' For Gallatin that was
enough to justify the treaty: "[T]he existence of the United
States as a nation presupposes the power enjoyed by every na-
tion of extending their territory by treaties, ... whilst this sec-
tion [Article IV, Section 3] provides the proper authority (viz.,
Congress) for either admitting in the Union or governing as sub-
jects the territory thus acquired." 28
As Representative Nicholson stressed, there were two distinct
constitutional issues: the power to acquire territory and the pow-
125. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
126. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
127. Representative Thomas Sandford of Kentucky, who described himself as "a
plain Western farmer," had a simpler theory to sustain the treaty 'The Constitution
does not prohibit the powers exercised on this occasion; and not having prohibited
them, they must be considered as possessed by Government." 13 ANNALS OF CONG.
454 (1803). Even a plain Western farmer, one would think, ought to read the Con-
stitution that defines his authority.
John Randolph, who was no lawyer either, seemed to think it comparable that
the United States had settled disputed borders by treaty and accepted a cession of
territory from Georgia. See id. at 435-36. In neither of these cases, however, was
there any pretense of acquiring territory outside the United States. See id. at 455
(statement of Rep. Thatcher). The same was true of the Indian treaties invoked by
Representative Mitchill. See id at 478. Whether they ceded jurisdiction or only title,
the land in question lay entirely within the boundaries drawn by the Treaty of Paris
in 1783. See id at 455.
Caesar Rodney of Delaware, considered one of the stars of the Republican fir-
mament, betrayed one of his party's fundamental principles in arguing unabashedly
that the General Welfare Clause empowered Congress to acquire territory, for he
made no effort to tie the expenditure to any of the substantive powers enumerated
in Article I. See id. at 472. In any event it was not Congress but the president,
with Senate consent, who had purportedly acquired Louisiana.
128. Letter from Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 13, 1803), in 1 THE
WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN 113 (Henry Adams ed., 1879) (dismissing Attorney
General Lincoln's unstable suggestion that the government could acquire territory
only to add to existing states); see also 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1282 (Leonard Levy ed., Da Capo Press
1970) (1833) (agreeing that Congress had the requisite authority). In support of the
option of governing the territory "as subjects," Gallatin appropriately invoked the
further clause of the same section authorizing Congress to "make all needful rules
and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United States." Let-
ter from Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, supra, at 112.
JEFFERSON AND THE WEST
er to admit it to the Union.'29 Jefferson had lumped them to-
gether in his first letter to Breckinridge, concluding that the
Constitution conferred neither authority.3 ' Senator Plumer, in
one passage in his diary, recited the same conclusion: "The con-
stitution of the United States was formed for the express pur-
pose of governing the people who then & thereafter should live
within the limits of the United States as then known & estab-
lished. It never contemplated the accession of a foreign people,
or the extension of territory." 3' He supported this conclusion
by quoting the Preamble, in which "[w]e the people of the United
States" spoke of establishing a constitution "for the United
States of America" in order, among other things, to "secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves & our posterity." 2
If that was the best opponents of acquisition could do, it was
pretty poor; nothing in the Preamble suggested that the United
States must remain within their original limits or that the "pos-
terity" of the Founders must live there. On its face the treaty
power was broad enough to include the normal authority to ac-
quire territory.'33 Surely, as Nicholson argued, the sovereign
129. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 467 (1803).
130. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckinridge, supra note 104, at 7
n.1.
131. PLUMER, supra note 100, at 7.
132. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. preamble).
133. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 448-49 (1802) (statement of Rep. Elliott) (arguing
that the treaty clause should be read in light of the law of nations and citing
Vattel, Grotius, Puffendorf, and others to establish the right to acquire territory by
treaty); see also RAWLE, supra note 26, at 65 (arguing, as the Supreme Court would
confirm in Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890), that the treaty power "ex-
tends to all those matters which are generally the subjects of compacts between in-
dependent nations").
Responding to Pickering's argument that Congress should not implement the
treaty because it was unconstitutional, Senator Taylor came close to falling into the
Holmes fallacy that because Article VI made all treaties created under U.S. authori-
ty supreme law whether or not, like statutes, they were enacted "in pursuance" of
the Constitution, there was no limit to the treaty power at all. See 13 ANNALS OF
CONG. 52-53 (1803); DAViD P. CURRiE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT:
THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 100-01 (1990). Tracy appropriately objected:
Surely a treaty could not impose a tax on exports, which Article I, Section 9 for-
bade. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 55 (1803). Nicholas set the record straight: Treaties
were limited by express prohibitions in the Constitution but not by the enumeration
of congressional powers. See id. at 69-70; cf Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957)
(confirming that treaties must comply with the Constitution).
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powers claimed for each state by the Declaration of Indepen-
dence had embraced this authority, and the states had trans-
ferred their external powers to the Union as early as the Arti-
cles of Confederation.1 4 Moreover, only a year before, the Fed-
eralists had advocated that the United States seize New Orleans
by force to enforce the right to free deposit of goods; 35 if terri-
tory could be acquired by war it was hard to see why it could not
be acquired by agreement as well." 6
In fact, neither Jefferson nor the Federalists in Congress seem
to have taken the constitutional objection to the mere acquisi-
tion of Louisiana very seriously. Though Jefferson insisted pri-
vately that the treaty power was not "boundless,""7 he never
explained why it did not include the traditional authority to ac-
quire territory, and in an earlier letter to Gallatin he had con-
ceded that it did.' Despite the passage quoted above, so did
Plumer, who in the same diary entry acknowledged that he had
no doubt the United States could acquire territory either by con-
quest or by treaty."9 So did several of the Federalists recorded
as speaking against implementation of the treaty,4 ° and not
one of them expressly denied that authority.'"
134. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 468 (1803); id. at 50 (statement of Sen. Taylor); id.
at 457 (statement of Rep. Smilie); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No state shall
enter into any treaty. .. ").
135. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
136. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 62 (1803) (statement of Sen. Breckinridge); id. at
71-72 (statement of Sen. Cocke). Representative Thatcher later denied that Federalist
advocates of force had meant to retain possession of the disputed territory after sub-
duing it, see id. at 455, but they had not made this qualification plain at the time
they were clamoring for war.
137. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 10
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 104, at 10-11 n.1.
138. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (Jan. 18, 1803), in 10
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 104, at 3 n.1. Neither Jefferson nor
any member of Congress had expressed constitutional doubts when Livingston and
Monroe were authorized to acquire New Orleans and the Floridas or when money
was appropriated to buy them.
139. See PLUMER, supra note 100, at 12.
140. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 45 (1803) (statement of Sen. Pickering); id. at 58
(statement of Sen. Tracy); id. at 463 (statement of Rep. Roger Griswold).
141. See HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINIS-
TRATIONS OF JEFFERSON AND MADISON 76 (William E. Leuchtenburg & Bernard
Wishy eds., Prentice Hall 1963) (1889) ("Every speaker, without distinction of party,
agreed that the United States government had the power to acquire new territory
1998] JEFFERSON AND THE WEST 1467
What they did insist, in Plumer's words, was that territory
outside the original boundaries of the United States "cannot be
admitted as a State into the Union without the previous consent
of each State first obtained."' For Article IV's provision for
admitting new states, said Connecticut Senator Uriah Tracy,
refers to domestic States only, and not at all to foreign
States; and it is unreasonable to suppose that Congress
should, by a majority only, admit new foreign States, and
swallow up, by it, the old partners, when two thirds of all the
members are made requisite for the least alteration in the
Constitution."
Jefferson had said much the same thing in a letter to Virginia
Senator Wilson Cary Nicholas, who had argued that Article IV
authorized the admission of Louisiana:'
[WIhen I consider that the limits of the U S are precisely
either by conquest or by treaty; the only difference of opinion regarded the disposi-
tion of this territory after it was acquired."); see also American Ins. Co. v. Canter,
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.) ("The Constitution confers absolutely
on the Government of the Union the powers of making war, and of making treaties;
consequently, that Government possesses the power of acquiring territory, either by
conquest or by treaty.").
142. PLUMEER, supra note 100, at 12; see 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 45 (1803)
(statement of Sen. Pickering); id. at 56 (statement of Sen. Tracy); id. at 463 (state-
ment of Rep. Roger Griswold) ("A new territory and new subjects may undoubtedly
be obtained by conquest and by purchase; but neither the conquest nor the purchase
can incorporate them into the Union."). Both Plumer and Griswold invoked the anal-
ogy of a partnership, whose agents could not admit new members. See id. at 461;
PLUMER, supra note 100, at 8. They might have done better to look at the words of
the document they were construing, which expressly authorized the peoples' agents
in Congress to admit new states.
Plumer's suggestion that even a constitutional amendment could not authorize
the admission of Louisiana had little to recommend it. The language of Article V
contained no relevant restriction on the amending power, and Congress would soon
reject the argument that there were implicit limitations. See Currie, supra note 5.
Moreover, if Article V did not authorize such an amendment it was not clear what
unanimous state consent would add; there was no provision authorizing the states,
with or without the support of Congress, to adopt amendments outside the scope of
Article V.
143. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 56 (1803); see also id. at 433 (statement of Rep.
Gaylord Griswold) (making a similar argument).
144. See Letter from Wilson Cary Nicholas to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 3, 1803), in
BROWN, supra note 119, at 26-27.
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fixed by the treaty of 1783, that the Constitution expressly
declares itself to be made for the U S, I cannot help believing
the intention was to permit Congress to admit into the Union
new States, which should be formed out of the territory for
which, & under whose authority alone, they were then acting.
I do not believe it was meant that they might receive Eng-
land, Ireland, Holland, &c. into it, which would be the case
on your construction.'45
There was nothing in the broad terms of Article IV to support
Jefferson's narrow interpretation. The operative provision de-
clares that "[niew states may be admitted by the Congress into
this Union"; the sole qualification is that existing states may not
be divided or joined without their consent.'46 Roger Griswold
argued that admission of states outside the original boundaries
would have such horrifying consequences that it could not have
been intended: It was unlikely the states would have ratified the
Constitution if they had imagined that "a new world was to be
thrown into the scale, to weigh down the influence which they
might otherwise possess in the national councils." 47 In support
of this assertion he might have added that with states carved
out of the original territory the Framers at least knew what they
were getting, in terms of both numbers and compatibility. But
there was nothing in the records of the Constitutional Conven-
tion, the state ratifying conventions, or The Federalist Papers to
suggest that the provision was intended to mean less than it
said.4 s The words of the provision were so sweeping, and its
145. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas, supra note 137, at 10
n.1.
146. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. Nicholas thought this explicit exception
proved that the authority was otherwise unconfined. See Letter from Wilson Cary
Nicholas to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 144, at 27.
147. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 462 (1803). He also made the bare assertion that ad-
mission of states outside the original boundaries would impair the "more perfect un-
ion" envisioned by the Preamble, but that was only a restatement of his conclusion.
See id. at 461 (quoting U.S. CONST. preamble).
148. The only subjects of recorded debate relating to the admission of states in
the Constitutional Convention were whether to provide that new states were to be
admitted on the same basis as the old (the Convention voted not to after several
delegates argued it would be a bad idea, but the principle had already been written
into the Northwest Ordinance) and whether to permit states like Virginia and North
1468
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purpose so plainly applicable to additional territories, that if the
delegates meant to limit statehood to territory already within
the jurisdiction of the United States one might have expected
them to say so-as, indeed, earlier rejected drafts would have
done."
Nor was it so obvious as Griswold said that the Framers
would have looked with disfavor on the admission of states out-
side the original boundaries. 5 ' There is much to be said for
the view that expansion had been American policy even before
the Constitution was adopted.' 5 ' As Gallatin pointed out in his
letter to Jefferson, the Articles of Confederation had explicitly
authorized admission of Canada and "other colon[ies]. "152 More-
over, in making the unavoidable concession that the United
States could acquire new territory, opponents of the treaty seri-
ously compromised their argument against the power to grant
statehood. Not only did it seem likely, as Breckinridge noted,
that the existence of colonial dependencies posed a greater dan-
ger to the Union than the admission of new states;'53 it was so
Carolina, which possessed vast domains west of the mountains, to be divided with-
out their consent. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 25, at 454-56, 461-65. In The Federal-
ist No. 43, Madison said only that it made sense to provide for the admission of
new states and to protect existing ones against involuntary alteration, as Article IV
did. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 273-74 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
149. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 25, at 147, 173. That the Convention considered
and rejected drafts that would have authorized the erection of new states only "with-
in the present limits of the united states," id. at 147, demonstrates that some dele-
gates thought such a limitation desirable, but surely not that this was the view of
the Convention as a whole.
150. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., DECONDE, supra note 97, at 41-55.
152. See Letter from Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 128, at 113.
John Adams thought it entirely possible that the Framers had actually contemplated
the admission of Canada as well as New Orleans and the Floridas. See Letter from
John Adams to Josiah Quincy (Feb. 9, 1811), in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS,
SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 631-32 (Charles Francis Adams ed.,
Books For Libraries Press 1969) (1850).
153. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 63 (1803). This point was illustrated graphically by
the yelps of indignation that emanated from Orleans when that territory was initial-
ly denied the elected legislature to which its population easily entitled it under the
principles of the Northwest Ordinance. See the "Remonstrance" presented to Con-
gress by an officious group of volunteers in the name of "the people of Louisiana,"
14 id. at 1014-17 (1805).
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inconsistent with the principle of self-government on which the
country had been founded" that it seems very difficult to deny
that the Framers would have wanted any territory that might be
acquired to come within the statehood provision. 5 ' Of course it
was the problem of existing territories that prompted the inclu-
sion of the clause authorizing admission of new states, 5 ' but
the language employed was general; there seems no more reason
to limit it to those territories than to hold that the Thirteenth
Amendment forbade the enslavement only of blacks.'57
Although both Gallatin and Nicholas had advised the presi-
dent that Article IV authorized Congress to admit states outside
the original boundaries,'58 and although Jefferson himself had
initially said admission was "a question of expediency,"'59 not
one Republican speaker was prepared to take a position on the
question in debate. Virginia Senator John Taylor denied that the
treaty required statehood: "[Tihe words are literally satisfied by
incorporating [Louisiana] into the Union as a territory, and not
as a State."' 0 Representative Smilie emphasized that the trea-
154. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
155. That the United States could acquire territory but not admit it to statehood,
wrote Madison's biographer, "meant that Congress had implied power to acquire colo-
nies but no power to treat their inhabitants as free and equal human beings." 4
BRANT, supra note 90, at 144.
156. See U.S. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
157. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1873). Several Federalista
argued that states could no more be added to than subtracted from the Union; obvi-
ously even a treaty could not transfer one of the original states to another country.
See PLUMER, supra note 100, at 9; 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 56 (1803) (statement of
Sen. Tracy); id. at 455 (statement of Rep. Thatcher). The Supreme Court has since
confirmed that states cannot be detached from the Union without their consent,
though the same tradition that established that one nation could accept territory
proved another could part with it. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890)
(dictum); cf Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 724-25 (1869) (holding a state had no
right to secede from the Union). Article IVs provision for new states, however, punc-
tured the syllogism by demonstrating that, whether or not states could be dropped,
they could sometimes be conjoined. Breckinridge and Nicholas explained the distinc-
tion by arguing that to cast out a state would offend Article IV, Section 4, which re-
quires the United States to guarantee that state a republican form of government.
See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 63, 70 (1803).
158. See supra notes 128, 144 and accompanying text.
159. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, supra note 138, at 3 n.1.
160. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 51 (1803); see id. at 487 (statement of Rep. Randolph).
Both Jefferson and Robert Smith had used the term "incorporation" in their pro-
posed constitutional amendments in the same limited sense. See supra notes 104-06
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ty provided for incorporation "according to the principles of the
Constitution," which he took to mean only if the Constitution
allowed it. 6 ' Senator Nicholas, assuming for the sake of argu-
ment that the treaty required statehood, saw no constitutional
difficulty: If the present Constitution did not permit admission
of states outside the initial boundaries, then it could always be
amended. 62 Massachusetts Senator John Quincy Adams, still
a Federalist and convinced that Article IV did not confer the req-
uisite authority, agreed: Even if, as some of his colleagues ar-
gued, every state had to consent, that could be arranged; it did
not impair the validity of the treaty."a
Thus while approval and implementation of the treaty re-
soundingly confirmed the power to acquire territory, Congress left
open the question whether that territory could be admitted to
statehood. After the treaty was safely approved, Adams forth-
rightly proposed to authorize its implementation by constitutional
amendment, as Jefferson had initially intended.'" Secretary of
and accompanying text. The distinction between "incorporated" and "unincorporated"
territories was to play a significant role in the so-called Insular Cases a century
later, when the question was the applicability of various constitutional provisions to
overseas possessions acquired by virtue of the Spanish-American War. See Dooley v.
United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); De Li-
ma v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); CURRIE, supra note 133, at 59-65.
161. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (1803); see PLUMER, supra note- 100, at 77
(statement of Sen. Anderson).
162. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 71 (1803).
163. "We can therefore fulfil[l] our part of the conventions, and this is all that
France has a right to require of us" I&. at 67-68. For similar reasons, Republicans
rightly rejected the Federalist objection that such authority to admit states as the
Constitution provided was given to Congress, rather than to the president and Sen-
ate. See id. at 56 (statement of Sen. Tracy); i&L at 433 (statement of Rep. Gaylord
Griswold); id. at 455-56 (statement of Rep. Thatcher). The treaty did not purport to
admit new states, and treaties commonly made promises-such as the appropriation
of money-that only Congress could perform. See id. at 70-71 (statement of Sen.
Nicholas); id. at 469 (statement of Rep. Nicholson).
164. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 67 (1803); 4 MALONE, supra note 97, at 330-31;
PLUMER, supra note 100, at 75. Unlike the backhanded and baroque amendments
Jefferson had drafted, see supra note 105, Adams's proposal was straightforward:
"Congress shall have power to admit into the Union the inhabitants of any territory
which has been or may be hereafter ceded to or acquired by the United States." 4
MALONE, supra note 97, at 330-31. Madison's counterproposal was even simpler but
failed to address the question of principle: "Louisiana is hereby admitted into this
Union." Id.; see SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE FOUNDATIONS
OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 120-21 n.28 (1949); 3 WRITINGS OF JOHN QUINCY AD-
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State Madison put him off with vague assurances that the matter
would be attended to later, adding that not everybody was con-
vinced an amendment was needed.'65 Meanwhile Jefferson had
become increasingly enamored of his bird in hand, assuaging his
doubts by professing willingness to defer to the judgment of his
friends in Congress.'66 Breckinridge, echoing Jefferson's earlier
argument that it would be best not to raise constitutional ques-
tions, added that an attempt to amend the Constitution was
risky: "If we attempt amendments & fail, we shall be placed in a
worse situation than we are now in."67 Adams's proposal was
rejected, 6 ' and no more was heard of a constitutional amend-
ment. Louisiana became a state in 1812.69
Commenting on the Louisiana Purchase a century later, Judge
Thomas Cooley roundly condemned both sides. The Federalists,
he argued, had betrayed their own principles by taking an absurd-
ly narrow view of federal authority and thereby sealed their own
oblivion. 7 ° Jefferson had betrayed his principles too, for he be-
lieved in strict interpretation of federal powers: "[U]nder a con-
struction of the Constitution as strict as [Jefferson] had been in-
AMS 20-21 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1914).
165. See 1 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, 267-68 (Charles Francis Adams ed.,
Books For Libraries Press 1969) (1874).
166. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas, supra note 137,
at 10-11 n.1.
167. PLUMER, supra note 100, at 76-77. Other Republicans argued that no amend-
ment was necessary because the treaty was constitutional, but on their theory that
the treaty was valid whether or not Congres could admit the new territory to state-
hood that did not necessarily obviate the need to amend. See id. (statements of
Sens. Wright, Cocke, and Anderson). New Jersey Federalist Jonathan Dayton took
the same position. See id. at 77. That supporters of statehood did not pause to
make a constitutional case when enacting a statutory promise of future admission,
however, was entirely consistent with that theory: Any constitutional doubts could be
eliminated by subsequent amendment. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying
text. Plumer voted against this bill for the same reason he had opposed the treaty.
"I think we cannot admit a new partner, formed from without the limits of the
United States, into the Union without the previous consent of each partner compos-
ing the firm first obtained." PLUMER, supra note 100, at 293.
168. See PLUMER, supra note 100, at 78. It received only three votes: those of
Adams, Pickering, and Hillhouse. See id.
169. See Act of Apr. 8, 1812, ch. 50, 2 Stat. 701 (1812) (amended 1812).
170. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE ACQUISITION OF LOUISIANA (1887), reprinted in
2 IND. HIST. SOC. PUBLICATIONS, 83-86 (1903) (speech delivered to the Indiana His-
torical Society (Feb. 16, 1887)).
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sisting upon, it was plain that the government would have no
power to acquire foreign territory by purchase .... 171
With all respect, this conclusion seems open to question. It is
easy enough to agree with Jefferson and Madison that not every
chain of distant consequences should suffice to make a measure
necessary and proper to the exercise of one of the limited con-
gressional powers, that the General Welfare Clause is not a li-
cense to spend federal money on whatever is good for the coun-
try, and that there is no room for the notions of unwritten power
that had helped to justify the Alien and Sedition Acts. 7 1 It is
very hard today, even for one who shares their general approach
to federal authority, to find merit in the remarkably cramped
reading that Jefferson in his most self-effacing moment offered
of the explicit authorization to make treaties"3 and to admit
states. 74
Cooley's more serious complaint was not that Jefferson's posi-
tion on Louisiana was inconsistent with his general philosophy,
but that the president had done what he believed to be unconsti-
tutional in the actual case. To Cooley it did not matter that the
Constitution really did empower Jefferson to make the disputed
171. Id. at 80; see 2 ADAMS, supra note 40, at 125-31.
172. See CURRIE, supra note 1, at 79-80, 169, 223 n.139, 254-61, 269.
173. In the manual of parliamentary practice he compiled as vice-president during
the late 1790s, Jefferson defined the treaty power to exclude both matters on which
Congress could legislate and those otherwise reserved to the states. See THOMAS
JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE, reprinted in JEFFERSON'S
PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS 420-21 (Wilbur Samuel Howell ed., Princeton Univ. Press
1988) (1812). As a leading commentator has observed, these painful limitations
"would leave little room for treaties." LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 189 n.* (2d ed. 1996). Thus it is not surprising that
such limitations have not been accepted, see Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267
(1890), but even they would not deny the president and Congress authority to ac-
quire territory by treaty.
174. For the same reason, one may question the conclusion of the eminent his-
torian Frederick Jackson Turner that the Louisiana Purchase "resulted in strength-
ening the loose interpretation of the Constitution." Frederick J. Turner, The Signifi-
cance of the Louisiana Purchase, 27 AM. MONTHLY REV. OF REVS. 578, 583 (1903);
see also 2 ADAMS, supra note 40, at 90 ("[T]he Louisiana treaty gave a fatal wound
to 'strict construction' ... ."). Yet Jefferson was surely right that to insist upon a
constitutional amendment (even in such an easy case, we might add) would have
"set an example against broad construction, by appealing for new power to the peo-
ple." See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas, supra note 137, at
10-11 n.1.
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arrangements; it was unforgivable for him to take the position
that he could do what he thought the Constitution forbade.
It is immaterial that as we look back upon [Jefferson's]
work we can see that what he did was not ultra vires; the
poison was in the doctrine which took from the Constitution
all sacredness, and made [it] subject to the will and caprice of
the hour .... After that time the proposal to exercise unwar-
ranted powers on a plea of necessity might be safely ad-
vanced without exciting the detestation it deserved .... '
Cooley's concern is certainly legitimate. The Constitution is
pretty worthless if presidents can ignore it whenever public
opinion is with them-or whenever they deem it advisable."6
Of course the Constitution itself is living proof that, as Governor
Randolph said in urging the Convention to disregard restrictions
on amending the Articles of Confederation, there are "great
seasons" when those with limits on their authority are justified
in disregarding them.'77 The colonists had relied heavily upon
John Locke's similar views in defending their rebellion against
Great Britain. 7 ' But as Locke himself had insisted, the moral
right of revolution must be strictly confined lest it gobble up the
rule of law entirely.79
Jefferson's initial plan stood on firmer ground. His analogy to
the faithful guardian who goes beyond his orders was a good
one. '8 Livingston and Monroe had exceeded the authority the
175. COOLEY, supra note 170, at 88-89; see also id. at 82 ("Mr. Jefferson, there-
fore, struck a dangerous blow at the foundation principles of the government, and
offered to demagogues who should come after him a corrupting and dangerous prece-
dent, when he proposed to violate the Constitution in order to accomplish an object
of immediate desire.").
176. Cf Washington's Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in 1 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 3, at 213, 220 (arguing against "change by
usurpation" and in favor of constitutional amendment where necessary).
177. 1 FARRAND, supra note 25, at 262.
178. Compare THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("That
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or abolish it") with JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 224-42 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1989) (1690) (discussing the dissolution
of governments).
179. See LOCKE, supra note 178, at 231-32.
180. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckinridge, supra note 104, at
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president gave them, and he had not only ratified their action
but applauded it."'1 Alexander Hamilton, like most other
prominent early statesmen, had taken a similar position with
regard to spending in anticipation of future appropriations, even
though the Constitution clearly required authorization from
Congress.'82 It was in the spirit of these precedents that Jef-
ferson proposed to seize the day and seek constitutional approv-
al afterward.183
Even if one rejects the analogy of the agent who anticipates
ratification of his actions, it seems difficult to chastise Jefferson
for ratifying the Louisiana treaty or the Senate for approving it. As
John Taylor argued, the only serious question was whether Con-
gress had the power to admit states within the new territory, and
that authority could be supplied by subsequent amendment."
Jefferson himself was not consistent in his extreme suggestion
that the territory could not even be acquired; it is not clear he did
anything that he was convinced he could not lawfully do.
Jefferson seems more subject to criticism for failure to follow
through on his original plan. A constitutional amendment would
have eliminated the argument that he was usurping power and
the objection that he thought he was above the law. It would
have removed lingering doubts as to the power to admit new
states when the time came. It would have strengthened the
Constitution by demonstrating respect for the rule of law. Final-
6-7 n.1; cf PHILIP MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 196 (4th ed. 1952)
("Every ratification is dragged back and treated as equivalent to prior authority.").
181. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
182. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; CURRIE, supra note 1, at 166 n.260 (discussing
the Giles Resolutions). See also Jefferson's Seventh Annual Message to Congress
(Oct. 27, 1807), in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 3, at
425, 428, reporting that, after the British seizure of the Chesapeake, Jefferson con-
tracted for military stores in advance of an appropriation, trusting that Congress
would ratify his decision-as of course it did. See Act of Nov. 24, 1807, 2 Stat. 450;
17 ANNALS OF CONG. 818-53 (1807). Only Randolph objected, see id. at 836-37;
Gardenier said the president had acted unconstitutionally but justifiably because "the
safety of the nation is the supreme law." Id. at 847-48. Others argued that because
Jefferson had only contracted to pay and had taken no money from the Treasury
there was no violation at all. See ad at 840-41, 847 (statements of Reps. Alston,
Chandler, Fisk, and Cook).
183. See, e.g., 1 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 165, at 267.
184. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 51-53 (1803); supra notes 133-36 and accompanying
text.
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ly, given the dominance of Jefferson's party both in Congress
and in the states, it seems likely he would have got an amend-
ment if he had tried." One is reminded of the New Deal."s
The most charitable explanation-and the most comforting-is
the one Jefferson suggested in private: that his constitutional
doubts were dissipated by the inability of his friends to share
them.87 On this hypothesis one can fairly refrain from casti-
gating Jefferson for concluding a deal that (at least to modern
eyes) seems to have been not only monumentally advantageous
but lawful as well.'
At a reunion of Justice Frankfurter's former law clerks some
years ago, one of the guests was heard to remark that it was
difficult to reconcile Jefferson's actions in the Louisiana affair
with his principle of limited federal authority. "That's right,"
replied the Justice with a cheekful of tongue, "and we've never
forgiven him!"
B. Other Constitutional Issues
In order "to favour the manufactures, Commerce, freight and
navigation of France and of Spain,"' Article VII of the Louisi-
ana treaty provided:
that the French ships coming directly from France or any of
her colonies, loaded only with the produce and manufactures
of France or her said colonies; and the ships of Spain coming
directly from Spain or any of her colonies, loaded only with
the produce and manufactures of Spain or her colonies, shall
185. See BROWN, supra note 119, at 29 ("Doubtless such an amendment as Jeffer-
son desired could have been carried without great difficulty ...
186. See CURRIE, supra note 133, at 235-38.
187. See supra notes 128, 166 and accompanying text.
188. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON 211 (1997):
The decision to bypass the constitutional issue was unquestionably cor-
rect, for the practical reason that the debate over a constitutional amend-
ment would have raised a constellation of nettlesome questions-about
slavery and the slave trade, Indian lands, Spanish land claims and a
host of other jurisdictional issues-that might have put the entire pur-
chase at risk.
189. Louisiana Treaty, supra note 98, 8 Stat. at 204.
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be admitted during the space of twelve years in the ports of
New Orleans, and in all other legal ports of entry within the
ceded territory, in the same manner as the ships of the Unit-
ed States coming directly from France or Spain, or any of
their colonies, without being subject to any other or greater
duty on merchandize, or other or greater tonnage than that
paid by the citizens of the United States."
In other words, French and Spanish ships loaded with their
own goods were to be exempted from the discriminatory tariff
and tonnage duties laid upon foreign vessels arriving in other
ports.'91 Congress implemented this provision by statute.
192
But several Federalists said it was unconstitutional.
Plumer made the obvious thrust in his journal: The eighth
section of Article I required duties, imposts, and excises to be
"uniform throughout the United States";93 the ninth forbade
Congress to give Louisiana ports a preference over others."
Vermont Representative James Elliott made the obvious parry:
Section 9 forbade preferences only for the ports of a state, not of
a territory or possession.' The Federalists had anticipated
190. Id.
191. See Act of July 20, 1789, 1 Stat. 27-28 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §
2651 (1994)); CURRIE, supra note 1, at 58.
192. See Act of Feb. 24, 1804, ch. 13, § 8, 2 Stat. 251, 253-54.
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
194. See PLUMER, supra note 100, at 11; see also 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1803)
(statement of Rep. Gaylord Griswold) (explaining that the treaty gave a preference
to Louisiana ports "[blecause the produce of France and Spain can be carried cheap-
er to their ports than to any other"). For other statements to the same effect, see 13
ANNALS OF CONG. at 441, 442-43 (statements of Reps. Lewis and Griffin). Rep. Roger
Griswold also invoked both clauses. See id. at 463-64.
195. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 450 (1803); see, e.g., id. at 482 (statement of Rep.
Mitchill); id. at 475 (statement of Rep. Rodney). Rep. Rodney gave the following
reasons for the distinction:
When Territories grow into States, and become represented in the public
councils, a majority of them may league together, and carry into effect
regulations prejudicial to other States .... But such a league cannot be
effected by Territories, which have no Senators in the other branch, and
in this only the voice, without the vote, of a single delegate.
Id. In addition, any special privilege conferred on territorial ports would redound to
the benefit of every state, because territories were "the common property of the
United States." Id
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this objection: The preference would become unconstitutional if
Louisiana became a state within the twelve-year period. 96 --as
in their view, Article III of the treaty required.197
The alternative argument for unconstitutionality was simpler,
for Section 8 required that duties be uniform "throughout the
United States."98 To argue that in this context the United
States meant the states themselves, as the Supreme Court
would later conclude in the Insular Cases,'9 would undermine
the crucial Republican position that Congress could incorporate
Louisiana into the United States, as the treaty demanded, with-
out making it a state.2°
The Republican response was the same demurrer they had
employed against the contention that Louisiana could not be
admitted to statehood: Uniformity could be achieved, and pref-
erences avoided, by eliminating the discriminatory duties
charged in other ports.2 ' Moreover, as Adams noted, the Con-
stitution could be amended before admission to permit the dis-
crimination it now forbade.0 2
196. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 57 (1803) (statement of Sen. Tracy); id. at 434
(statement of Rep. Gaylord Griswold); id. at 455-56 (statement of Rep. Thatcher).
When Louisiana did become a state in 1812, this "difficulty" was unaccountably over-
looked. See Max Farrand, The Commercial Privileges of the Treaty of 1803, 7 AM.
HIST. REv. 494, 495 (1902).
197. Mitchill argued that the Preference Clause was "meant as a check to the
legislative power of Congress only, and by no means as a restraint upon the treaty-
making power of the President and Senate." 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 481 (1803). In
support of this position it may be noted that the clause appears in Article I, which
deals generally with the legislative power, and that what it forbids are "regula-
tion[s]," which sounds like statutes. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. But treaties often
contain regulations too, and the Appropriations Clause of the same section plainly
limits executive action; the purpose of the Preference Clause, like that of the adja-
cent ban on export taxes, applies to treaties as well.
198. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
199. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
200. See CURRIE, supra note 133, at 61-63; PLUMER, supra note 100, at 11-12.
201. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (1803) (statement of Rep. Randolph).
202. See id. at 67. Representative Griffin argued that the provision barring dis-
criminatory duties was void because it was a regulation of commerce that only Con-
gress could make. See id. at 442. Nicholas soundly responded that "the treaty-making
power may negotiate respecting many of the subjects upon which Congress may legis-
late." Id. at 70. Whether, as he went on to say, Congress was free not to execute such
a treaty was one of the questions that had been agitated in the debates over the Jay
Treaty nearly a decade before. See id.; CURRIE, supra note 1, at 211-17.
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Not content to rest on the irrefragable point that Louisiana
was not yet a state subject to the ban on port preferences, Rep-
resentative Nicholson seemed to allow himself to be carried
away: "It is a territory purchased by the United States in their
confederate capacity, and may be disposed of by them at plea-
sure. It is in the nature of a colony whose commerce may be
regulated without any reference to the Constitution."2"'
If he meant what he said, then one is left wondering where he
thought the government got authority to govern Louisiana at all,
or indeed to acquire it; for the Constitution is the sole source of
federal power.!
Because Nicholson made this comment in the context of an
argument that Louisiana was not a state within the meaning of
the Preference Clause, and because he later asserted that it was
the Territorial Clause of Article IV that empowered Congress to
take possession of the ceded area,"5 it may well be that he did
not mean the Constitution did not apply at all.2"6 Soon after-
ward, however, when the House began to discuss the first bill to
implement the treaty, two Representatives unmistakably took
that remarkable position.2"7
The bill authorized the president, if necessary, to employ
military and naval forces to take possession of Louisiana.2"' It
also provided that, until Congress made provision for the tempo-
rary government of the territories, "all the military, civil, and
judicial powers, exercised by the officers of the existing govern-
ment of the same, shall be vested in such person and persons,
and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the
United States shall direct."209 Federalists raised a variety of
203. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 471 (1803) (statement of Rep. Nicholson).
204. Even the argument that the necessary authority is inherent in sovereignty
ultimately rests upon the Constitution, for at least to the modern mind that docu-
ment is the source of federal sovereignty.
205. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 502 (1803).
206. Henry Adams, however, took Nicholson at his word. See 2 ADAMS, supra note
40, at 102.
207. See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
208. See Act of Oct. 31, 1803, ch. 1, § 2, 2 Stat. 245, amended by Act of Mar. 26,
1804, ch. 38, 2 Stat. 289.
209. Id. The bill was enacted as introduced, with two exceptions. At Randolph's
request, it was amended to expire no later than the end of the current legislative
session, see 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 498 (1803), and in accord with the treaty, the
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constitutional objections to this provision. Representatives
Varnum and Smilie replied that the Constitution did not apply.
The terms of the treaty, said Varnum, made clear that the
Constitution was not to take effect in Louisiana the minute the
government took possession. 1' The inhabitants of the territory
were to be admitted to the rights of citizenship, in accordance
with the principles of the Constitution, in the future; in the mean-
time they were instead to enjoy their existing rights under Span-
ish law.21" ' Smilie agreed: "[T]he Constitution of the United
States did not extend to this territory any farther than they were
bound by the compact between the ceding power and the people,"
and thus Louisiana could be given "such government as the Gov-
ernment of the United States might think proper ...""'
Representative Rodney's theory for upholding the challenged
provision avoided the logical difficulty of arguing that the Con-
stitution did not apply to the territory at all, but the effect of his
theory was just as broad. Article IV's grant of power to adopt
"all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States,"21' he argued,
"does not limit or restrain the authority of Congress with respect
to Territories, but vests them with full and complete power to
exercise a sound discretion generally on the subject." 4 Thus
this provision put an end to all constitutional objections; Con-
gress could do as it liked with Louisiana." 5
These assertions of plenary congressional authority over the
territories contrasted sharply with the narrow conceptions later
embraced by the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case.2"6 Not
following words were added to the end of the provision: "for maintaining and pro-
tecting the inhabitants of Louisiana in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property
and religion," § 2, 2 Stat. at 245.
210. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 505 (1803).
211. See id. at 505-06.
212. Id. at 511-12. Dayton and Pickering, both Federalists, came to the same
conclusion in the Senate. See PLUMER, supra note 100, at 136-37.
213. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
214. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 513 (1803).
215. See id. at 513-14.
216. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); see also DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888,
at 267-73 (1985) (discussing the Dred Scott case).
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one Southerner in Congress protested at the time; only Yankee
Federalists raised constitutional objections to the interim gov-
ernment provision, 17 and it was Connecticut's Roger Griswold
who protested that "the idea of some gentlemen, that this terri-
tory, not being a part of the United States,... and that there-
fore we may do as we please with it," was "not correct."218
This time the constitutional text seemed to support the Feder-
alist position. As Rodney said, the language of Article IV looked
broad enough to give Congress general legislative authority over
the territories." But the Bill of Rights, at least, was phrased
as a limitation on all congressional powers.2 Indeed in the
then recent debate over disestablishment of the District of Co-
lumbia, several Republican congressmen had insisted, almost
without contradiction, that its provisions applied to the seat of
government-over which Congress had powers at least as sweep-
ing as those conferred by Article IVl.
221
The following year, when Congress came to establish a tempo-
217. John Randolph successfully urged that the necessary authority last no longer
than the present session of Congress, perceiving that "[i]f we give this power out of
our hands, it may be irrevocable until Congress shall have made legislative provi-
sion; that is, a single branch of the Government, the Executive branch, with a small
minority of either House, may prevent its resumption." 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 498
(1803). This was a pretty compelling answer to the common contention that delega-
tions of legislative power are no cause for concern because Congress can always re-
claim its authority.
218. Id. at 510.
219. See Ud. at 513.
220. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law...
221. See id., art. I, § 8, cl. 17: "The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District ... ." See, e.g., 14
ANNALS OF CONG. 927 (1805) (statement of Rep. Lucas); id. at 946 (statement of
Rep. Goddard); i. at 956 (statement of Rep. Lewis); id. at 960-61 (statement of Rep.
Williams); id. at 973 (statement of Rep. Dennis). But see i& at 962 (statement of
Rep. Stanford) (arguing that, by authorizing Congress to exercise legislative authority
over the District "in all cases whatever," Article I, Section 8 made the (later) Bill of
Rights inapplicable); id. at 908-10 (statement of Rep. Elmer) (arguing that Congress's
power under Article I, Section 8 was discretionary). The Supreme Court has con-
firmed that the Bill of Rights applies. See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888). In
suggesting that such rights as jury trial and freedom of press and religion be ex-
tended to Louisiana gradually by local legislation, however, Jefferson appeared to
assume that the Bill of Rights did not apply there of its own force. See Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (Nov. 9, 1803), in 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 104, at 46.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1441
rary government for the Orleans Territory, Representative G.W.
Campbell, a Tennessee Republican, moved to provide for trial by
jury in all criminal prosecutions and in all civil cases involving
more than twenty dollars, in accord with the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments.2 In legislating for the new province, said
Campbell, Congress was "bound by the Constitution of the Unit-
ed States" and "had not a right to establish courts in that Terri-
tory on any other terms than they could in any of the
States."223 His motion was roundly rejected, receiving only
twenty votes m
Interestingly, though there had been territories since the
beginning, Congress had never debated this issue before. The
Northwest Ordinance, which antedated the Constitution, con-
tained its own catalog of basic rights, from religious freedom,
habeas corpus, and jury trial to protection against cruel and
unusual punishment, uncompensated takings, and impairment
of preexisting private contracts. 2' All other territories estab-
lished prior to Orleans and Louisiana were subjected by statute
to most, if not all, of the Ordinance provisions.2 ' But the very
existence of those statutory rights provisions, and the fact that
they by no means embraced all the protections of the Bill of
Rights,2 7 are some evidence that earlier Congresses may not
have shared Campbell's view that those constitutional provisions
applied to the territories of their own force.
222. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 1129 (1804). The Seventh Amendment itself applied
only to suits at common law, but equity was unknown in Spanish and French law.
223. Id. (statement of Rep. Campbell).
224. See id.
225. See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 1-2, 1 Stat. 50, 52 n.(a) (amended
1789).
226. The Southwest and Mississippi Territories were exempted from the prohibi-
tion of slavery. The Indiana Territory, which had been part of the original North-
west Territory, remained subject to the Ordinance in its entirety. See CURRIE, supra
note 1, at 107, 286.
227. The Northwest Ordinance conspicuously omitted such central rights as free-
dom of expression, assembly, and petition, as well as provisions respecting searches
and seizures, self-incrimination, double jeopardy, and other procedural rights of the
accused.
228. There is no evidence, however, that members of Congress had thought about
the question whether the Bill of Rights applied to the territories. An alternative
explanation is that the simplest and most uniform solution was to incorporate the
Ordinance to govern the later territories, because it had met with general approval.
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The Federalists' objections, both to the emergency provision
preserving Spanish law and to the later plan for a temporary
territorial authority, were not based on the Bill of Rights. They
went to the basic structure of government.
By providing that existing powers should be exercised by such
persons as the president might designate, said Roger Griswold,
the emergency bill effectively gave him legislative and judicial as
well as executive powers, contrary to the separation the Consti-
tution required.229 The Constitution, Elliott added, "delegated
the legislative power to Congress, and not to the President;...
it not only precluded the President from exercising it, but like-
wise forbade our delegation of it to him."' ° Nicholson respond-
ed that the bill merely authorized the president to appoint those
who would exercise legislative and judicial powers,"' but as
Griswold observed that was not so; it also said those powers
should be exercised as the president might direct."' Moreover,
said Griswold, even the provision for appointment was not in
accord with the requirements applicable to ordinary federal
officers; for neither the governor nor the judges were "inferior
officers" whom the president was authorized to appoint under
Article II, Section 2."'
In addition to denying that there were any constitutional
limits to Congress's power over Louisiana, defenders of the
emergency provisions invoked the law of necessity: Something
Moreover, it was not pointless to make the Ordinance applicable even if the Bill of
Rights did apply, for in some respects (e.g., the duty to support education and the
sometimes omitted antislavery provision), the Ordinance went beyond what the Con-
stitution required. See Northwest Ordinance, art. 1-2, 1 Stat. at 52 n.(a).
Even if the Bill of Rights does apply to congressional action respecting the
territories, whether it also limits the acts of local territorial authorities is a separate
question. The best argument that it does is that Congress cannot authorize others to
do what it could not do itself without undermining the purposes of its provisions.
229. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 500-01, 508-09 (1803).
230. Id. at 508; see id. at 499.
231. See id. at 501.
232. See id. at 509.
233. Id.; see PLUMAER, supra note 100, at 26-27. Griswold was also concerned
about the nature of the powers whose exercise the president was to direct because
[ut is probable that some of them may be inconsistent with the Constitution of the
United States," which among other things guaranteed the availability of habeas
corpus. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 499 (1803).
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had to be done to preserve order until a proper government
could be put in place.2 4 Others cited pertinent legislative
precedent.3 5 For there were numerous respects in which the
organization of territorial governments had consistently depart-
ed from that which the Constitution prescribed for the federal
government itself. For one thing, in every preexisting territory,
legislative authority was initially vested in the Governor and
judges, all of whom were appointed rather than elected. 36
Thus precedent seemed to recognize in the territories neither the
separation of powers, nor meaningful limitations on the delega-
tion of congressional authority, nor a constitutional right of
democratic self-government-which was feebly asserted
237
when the 1804 bill was criticized for failure to provide for an
elected assembly.238
234. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 499-500 (1803) (statement of Rep. Randolph); id.
at 506-07 (statement of Reps. Eppes and Eustis); id. at 513 (statements of Rep.
Rodney). Both Randolph and Rodney analogized to the case of military conquest.
See also Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 730 (1868) (confirming the president's au-
thority, as commander-in-chief, to institute temporary government in conquered
Southern states); 4 MALONE, supra note 97, at 329 ("No one could justly de-
ny . . . that for a time at least the exercise of executive power was the only visi-
ble alternative to anarchy.").
235. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 514 (1803) (statement of Rep. Rodney); PLT3MER,
supra note 100, at 137 (statement of Sen. Wright).
236. See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. III-IV, 1 Stat. 51, 52 n.(a) (amended
1789). This provision, like others of the Ordinance, was made applicable to later ter-
ritories by statute. See supra note 29.
237. Few speakers invoked the Constitution, and with good reason; the best they
could manage was to appeal to the "spirit" of that document, see 13 ANNALS OF
CONG. 1056 (1804) (statement of Rep. Elliott), or of Article IV's guarantee of a re-
publican form of government, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; PLUMER, supra note 100,
at 136 (statement of Sen. Anderson), which as Senator Wright noted applied only to
states, not to territories. See id. at 137. Breckinridge, who argued for an elected leg-
islature, expressly said there was no constitutional problem. See id. at 138.
238. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 1054-78 (1804); PLUMER, supra note 100, at 134-38.
The House amended the bill to provide for representative government, but receded
in the face of Senate disapproval. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 1191-99, 1229-30 (1804).
As enacted, the statute placed legislative authority in the Orleans Territory in the
hands of the governor and an appointed legislative council and attached Louisiana
administratively to the Indiana Territory. See Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 38, §§ 4, 12,
2 Stat. 283, 284, 287 (repealed 1804). The following year legislative power in Louisi-
ana was given to the governor and judges. See Act of Mar. 3, 1805, ch. 31, § 3, 2
Stat. 331 (repealed 1812). Orleans was given an elected assembly that year as well.
See Act of Mar. 2, 1805, § 2, 2 Stat. 322.
In light of the same precedents and of the plain language of Article IV with
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Appointment by the president alone, in contrast, was a strik-
ing departure from precedent. Earlier statutes, as Roger
Griswold noted, had required Senate confirmation of important
territorial appointments,"39 and the First Congress had gone
out of its way to bring the Ordinance itself into conformity with
Article H's requirement that federal officers be appointed by the
president with Senate consent.' ° Similarly, Congress's subse-
quent decision to provide four-year terms for judges in the new
territories24 was a novelty, since earlier statutes had adopted
the Ordinance provision purporting to give territorial judges the
same tenure during "good behavior" required of federal judges by
Article I.'242 Yet Adams's constitutional protest 243 fell upon
respect to governance of the territories, Adams's related argument that Congress
lacked authority to set up any government for Louisiana without its consent, see
PLUMER, supra note 100, at 73, 143, was, at best, a rerun of his contention that the
statehood provision of the same Article applied only within the original United
States. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. There wasn't much to his addi-
tional contention that Louisiana could not be taxed without its consent either; the
Declaration of Independence was not part of the Constitution. See 13 ANNALS OF
CONG. 228 (1804); PLUMER, supra note 100, at 103; 3 WRrITNGS OF JOHN QUINCY
ADAMS, supra note 164, at 26-30.
239. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 509 (1803); see Act of May 7, 1800, ch. 41, § 2, 2 Stat.
58, 59 (amended 1801) (Indiana); Act of Apr. 7, 1798, ch. 28, § 3, 1 Stat. 549, 550
(amended 1800) (Mississippi); Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, § 2, 1 Stat. 123 (South-
west Territory).
240. See Northwest Ordinance, art. 1, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 53 (1789) (amended 1800);
CUIRRIE, supra note 1, at 106. At the time Mississippi governor Winthrop Sargent
came under attack for his conduct in office, it was also assumed that the impeach-
ment provisions of Articles I and II applied to territorial officers. See 10 ANNALS OF
CONG. 854 (1800) (appointing a committee to investigate charges with a view toward
impeachment); id. at 1037; H.R. REP. No. 6-143 (1801), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS (MISC.), supra note 117, at 233-41 (finding no evidence of corrupt mo-
tives and recommending no further proceedings); see also ANNALS OF CONG. 2068-69,
2189 (1808) (appointing a committee to consider impeachment of a territorial judge).
241. See Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 38, § 5, 2 Stat. 283, 284 (Orleans); Act of Mar.
3, 1805, ch. 31, § 4, 2 Stat. 331 (Louisiana).
242. See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. IV, 1 Stat. 51n.(a) (amended 1789);
Act of May 7, 1800, ch. 41, § 2, 2 Stat. 58, 59 (amended 1801); Act of Apr. 18,
1798, ch. 28, § 3, 1 Stat. 549, 550; Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, § 1, 1 Stat. 123; 13
ANNALS OF CONG. 505 (1803) (statement of Rep. Dana). The suggestion of limited
tenure came from President Jefferson. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John
Breckinridge (Nov. 24, 1803), in 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note
104, at 51-52.
243. "The Judicial officers are to be appointed for a term of years only, & yet the
bill is not limited. The constitutional tenure for judicial officers is during good be-
havior." PLUMER, supra note 100, at 144; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Representa-
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deaf ears. 44 There seemed to be nearly universal agreement
that territorial courts did not exercise the judicial power of the
United States within the meaning of Article III." In short, all
constitutional objections brought forward in the Louisiana de-
bates were decisively rejected.2" For practical purposes, Con-
gress appeared to think the only constitutional provisions that
applied to the territories were those authorizing the United
States to acquire and administer them; how it did so seemed to
be, as Rodney said, within the discretion of Congress.247
It was at least arguable, as the Supreme Court would later
tive Campbell, who, in arguing for trial by jury declared that Congress "had not a
right to establish courts in that Territory on any other terms than they could in any
of the States," 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 1129 (1804), did not follow the implications of
this statement for the tenure of judges. Adams returned the favor, suggesting that
while the first section of Article III applied to Louisiana, the third section did not:
"Tis too soon to extend the trial by jury to that Country." PLUMER, supra note 100,
at 145.
244. Indeed, as already noted, Congress created a commission rather than a court
to pass on land claims in Louisiana, without recorded objection. See supra text ac-
companying note 118.
245. The Supreme Court would hold that they did not in American Insurance Co.
v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). See CURRIE, supra note 216, at 119-22.
246. Worthington's proposal to authorize Orleans (like other territories) to send a
nonvoting delegate to the House was initially defeated after white, Dayton, and Ad-
ams raised constitutional objections. The next year, however, Orleans was granted
"all the rights, privileges, and advantages" secured by the Ordinance and enjoyed in
Mississippi, and Daniel Clark took his seat as Delegate on December 1, 1806. See
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1774-1989, 73 (Bicen-
tennial ed. 1989) [hereinafter BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY]. Some of the arguments
against such a provision again rested on the fact that Orleans lay outside the initial
boundaries of the Union; others had been rejected in the case of the Southwest Ter-
ritory. Several senators, without citing the Constitution, invoked the separation of
powers: Because the legislative council that would choose the delegate was appointed
by the president, he would represent the president and not the people. See PLUMER,
supra note 100, at 107-09; Act of Mar. 2, 1805, ch. 23, § 1, 2 Stat. 322; CURRIE,
supra note 1, at 200-03. Citing the Northwest Ordinance, the statute applying the
Ordinance to Mississippi, and the later Act giving that territory an elected legisla-
ture, a House committee recognized Mississippi's right to a delegate in 1801, and
Narsworthy Hunter was duly elected to represent Mississippi in the Seventh Con-
gress. See H.R. REP. NO. 7-147 (1801), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS
(MISC.), supra note 117, at 252; BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY, supra, at 67. Indiana was
given a delegate in 1809. See Act of Feb. 27, 1809, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Stat. 525 (amend-
ed 1809).
247. See supra notes 214-216 and accompanying text.
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conclude," that a more discriminating approach was in order.
Prior legislative practice is suggestive, even though Congress
may have based its earlier decisions respecting appointments
and judicial tenure on policy considerations rather than constitu-
tional compulsion.' 9 On its face, Article I's provision for popu-
lar election applies only to the House of Representatives, not to
a territorial legislature; and the provisions of the Ordinance,
unchanged after adoption of the new Constitution, suggest that
delegation of legislative authority to a local body composed of
appointed executive and judicial officers was within the contem-
plation of the FramersY.0 But both the language and the pur-
poses of the appointment and tenure provisions, as well as the
Bill of Rights, seem no less applicable to territories than to fed-
eral action affecting the states. The last word on these questions
was not spoken during the debates on the Louisiana Purchase.
III. INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS
In exchange for a tax break on federal lands sold within its
borders, the Ohio Enabling Act had offered the new state,
among other things, a portion of the proceeds of those sales for
the construction of roads." The Ohio convention accepted the
deal, on conditions to which Congress agreed.12 In March 1803
Congress appropriated three percent of the proceeds to be paid
to the state for road construction within its borders, in partial
satisfaction of its side of the bargain.13 Three years later Con-
248. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1856) (applying the Due
Process Clause and other Bill of Rights provisions to the territories acquired by the
Louisiana Purchase); CURRIE, supra note 133, at 62-65 (discussing the distinction
drawn for this purpose in the Insular Cases (e.g., Rassmussen v. United States, 197
U.S. 516, 525-26 (1905)), between "incorporated" and "unincorporated" areas, in terms
reminiscent of the Louisiana treaty).
249. Moreover, in the case of the Northwest Territory some change was obviously
necessary because the old Continental Congress, which had previously made appoint-
ments under the Ordinance, no longer existed.
250. It also conformed to parliamentary practice before the Revolution. See
MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 22, at 7-16.
251. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
252. See Act of Mar. 3, 1803, ch. 21, 2 Stat. 225; 1 STATUTES OF OHIO AND
NORTHWESTERN TERRITORY 74 (Chase 1833).
253. See ch. 21, § 2, 2 Stat. 225, 226.
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gress dropped the other shoe, authorizing the president to ap-
point commissioners to lay out a road from Cumberland, Mary-
land (or some nearby point) to the state of Ohio.'
If the president approved the commissioners' plans, he was
empowered to seek the consent of each affected state for passage
of the road through its territory,"s and thereupon "to take
prompt and effectual measures to cause said road to be made
through the whole distance, or in any part or parts of the same
as he shall judge most conducive to the public good.""5 Con-
gress initially appropriated thirty thousand dollars for the pur-
pose. 57 The remaining two percent of land proceeds promised
in the Enabling Act were to be drawn first."5 If they did not
suffice, resort was to be had to "any money in the treasury not
otherwise appropriated," to be repaid out of future land
sales." 9
The three-year delay in carrying out the agreement is evi-
dence that, despite the absence of recorded objections when the
Ohio Enabling Act was passed, construction of the road to Ohio
had become a matter of some controversy. Bills were introduced
in three successive sessions before one finally was adopted."'
254. See Act of Mar. 29, 1806, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Stat. 357, 357-58. For a detailed
summary of the tortuous history of this project (with particular emphasis on the
continuing congressional debates), see JEREMIAH S. YOUNG, A POLITICAL AND CONSTI-
TUTIONAL STUDY OF THE CUMBERLAND ROAD (1902).
255. The requirement of state consent was in accord with the Enabling Act. If
anyone in Congress thought that consent was constitutionally required, see infra text
accompanying notes 288-91 (discussing Gallatin's 1808 report), he didn't say so. The
consent provision did not moot the basic constitutional question, because a single
state could not legitimate spending for a purpose beyond the authority of Congress.
256. Ch. 19, § 3, 2 Stat. at 358-59. Thus the president, not Congress as a House
draft at one point would have provided, see 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 986 (1804), was to
select the route. If there were constitutional objections to this delegation, as there
had been in connection with designation of post roads in the First and Second Con-
gresses, see CURRIE, supra note 1, at 146-49, Congress did not find them convincing.
257. See ch. 19, § 6, 2 Stat. at 359.
258. See id.
259. Ch. 19, § 6, 2 Stat. at 359. Although any money taken from general funds
in the Treasury was to be reimbursed from future land sales, the authorization to
use it at all arguably meant that the Act could no longer be defended simply as a
disposition of land and its proceeds; some constitutional justification would still have
to be found for lending general tax revenues for the purpose of internal improve-
ments. See CURRIE, supra note 1, at 72-73 (discussing an abortive proposal to lend
federal funds to promote the manufacture of glass).
260. See 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 39, 43, 200 (1806); id. at 22 (1805); 14 id. at 27,
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Reports of debates on those bills are fragmentary. There was
squabbling over how much money Ohio had been promised26'
and whether congressional action was premature.262 The final
bill passed the House by the narrow margin of sixty-six to fif-
ty 2" Many people were plainly dragging their feet.
For constitutional reasons? The record does not reveal them.
But the record is so spotty that one cannot be confident that no
constitutional objections were made. Nor does the record reveal
whether anyone took the floor to defend the constitutionality of
the bill. Senator Tracy's committee report waxed eloquent in
justifying the new road:
Politicians have generally agreed that rivers unite the in-
terests and promote the friendship of those who inhabit their
banks; while mountains, on the contrary, tend to the disunion
and estrangement of those who are separated by their inter-
vention. In the present case, to make the crooked ways
straight, and the rough ways smooth, will, in effect, remove
the intervening mountains, and by facilitating the intercourse
of our Western brethren with those on the Atlantic, substan-
tially unite them in interest, which, the committee believe, is
the most effectual cement of union applicable to the human
race.
26
But neither Tracy nor anyone else was reported to have ad-
dressed the question of congressional authority-perhaps be-
cause it was thought to have been settled by adoption of the En-
abling Act, which had initially proposed the bargain.
In light of what President Jefferson had said in his second
776 (1804); 13 Id. at 305, 1012, 1242 (1804); 13 id. at 553 (1803).
261. There was a minor dustup over whether the three percent voted for local
roads was intended to be over and above the five percent initially offered, but the
majority rejected the claim. See ch. 19, § 6, 2 Stat. 359; H.R. REP. No. 7-147 (1801),
reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS (MISC.), supra note 117, at 340-41; 14 AN-
NALS OF CONG. 37 (1805); 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 631-36 (1803); 1 MEMOIRS OF JOHN
QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 165, at 335-36.
262. Smile argued that Congress should wait until there was significant money
in the Treasury, see 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 943 (1804); Leib argued for waiting until
state consent was obtained, see 15 id. at 836 (1806).
263. 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 840 (1806).
264. Id. at 25 (1805).
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inaugural address only a few months before, someone might nev-
ertheless have been expected to raise the constitutional question.
Basking in the light of a successful first term and overwhelm-
ing electoral approval,265 the president boasted that despite
elimination of most internal taxes the Treasury had accumulat-
ed a surplus that had been applied to Gallatin's pet project,
reduction of the public debt.266 Once that debt was retired, he
optimistically continued, "the revenue thereby liberated may, by
a just repartition of it among the States and a corresponding
amendment of the Constitution, be applied in time of peace to
rivers, canals, roads, arts, manufactures, education, and other
great objects within each State." 7
In short, Jefferson favored not only territorial expansion, but
also an aggressive program of federal spending that would have
done justice to his old adversary Alexander Hamilton."' By
lumping internal improvements with federal aid to education
and industry that could be justified only by a broad reading of
the General Welfare Clause his party had always rejected, how-
ever, Jefferson appeared to be saying that improvements re-
quired a constitutional amendment. That was what he had said
privately about Louisiana at one point;269 but in the case of im-
provements he commendably disclosed his constitutional doubts
to Congress as he urged an amendment to provide the necessary
authority.
265. Jefferson and George Clinton received 162 electoral votes in the 1804 election
to 14 for C.C. Pinckney and Rufus King. See 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 56 (1805).
266. See Second Inaugural Address of Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 4, 1805), in 1 MES-
SAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, supra note 3, at 378-79.
267. Id.
268. As early as 1801 Jefferson had urged Congress to consider occasional aids to
relieve "[a]griculture, manufactures, commerce, and navigation . . . from casual em-
barrassments,... within the limits of our constitutional powers." First Annual Mes-
sage of Thomas Jefferson to Congress (Dec. 8, 1801), in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, supra note 3, at 326, 330-31. Compare Hamilton's ambi-
tious 1791 Report on Manufactures, see CURRIE, supra note 1, at 72, 169 n.283, pro-
posing federal subsidies to encourage manufacturing.
Predictably, Hamilton thought Congress should subsidize internal improvements
too: "To provide roads and bridges is within the direct purview of the constitution,"
and canals and aqueducts were also "fit subjects" for federal aid. ALEXANDER HAMIL-
TON, The Examination, Number III, in 25 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAmILTON,
1800-1802, supra note 122, at 464, 467.
269. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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This time the answer does not seem to be that Jefferson was
persuaded by his friends in Congress that they already had the
necessary authority, as in the case of Louisiana."' Nine months
after signing the Cumberland Road bill, he returned to the sub-
ject of improvements in his sixth annual address to Congress,
urging once again that future surpluses be applied
to the great purposes of the public education, roads, rivers,
canals, and such other objects of public improvement as it
may be thought proper to add to the constitutional enumera-
tion of Federal powers.... I suppose an amendment to the
Constitution... necessary, because the objects now recom-
mended are not among those enumerated in the Constitution,
and to which it permits the public moneys to be applied.2
This time there could be no doubt. Stripped of Hamiltonian
schemes for the support of manufacturing, the president's mes-
sage was clear: Congress could finance neither education nor
internal improvements under the existing Constitution.
Yet in the next paragraph of his 1806 address Jefferson drew
a distinction that might serve to explain at last how he was able
to endorse the Cumberland Road bill despite his narrow view of
federal authority:
The present consideration of a national establishment for
education particularly is rendered proper by this circum-
stance also, that if Congress, approving the proposition, shall
yet think it more eligible to found it on a donation of lands,
they have it now in their power to endow it with those which
will be among the earliest to produce the necessary in-
come 2
In other words, although Congress could not appropriate tax
revenues to support education, it could accomplish the same goal
by a grant of public lands. If that was true of education, then it
270. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
271. Sixth Annual Message of Thomas Jefferson to Congress (Dec. 2, 1806), in 1
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, supra note 3, at 405, 409-10.
272. Id. at 410.
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was true of roads and canals as well; and thus the great battle
between Federalists and Republicans over the scope of federal
spending power was reduced to a petty squabble over the source
of funds.
As if to underline this troubling distinction, less than two
months after denying Congress's authority to finance internal
improvements, the president ceremoniously filed with Congress
the first of a series of reports proudly detailing the progress he
had made toward construction of the Cumberland Road. 3
In his last annual message, in November 1808, Jefferson
brought the question of improvements to the attention of Con-
gress one more time. Though this address was dominated by
concerns over hostile actions by Britain and France, the presi-
dent also found room to speculate about the disposition of sur-
plus revenue "whenever the freedom and safety of our commerce
shall be restored":
274
Shall it lie unproductive in the public vaults? Shall the
revenue be reduced? Or shall it not rather be appropriated
to the improvements of roads, canals, rivers, education, and
other great foundations of prosperity and union under the
powers which Congress may already possess or such amend-
ment of the Constitution as may be approved by the States?
While uncertain of the course of things, the time may be
advantageously employed in obtaining the powers necessary
273. See Thomas Jefferson, Message to Congress (Jan. 31, 1807), in 1 MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 3, at 418. The commissioners he had
appointed, Jefferson recounted, had filed their report recommending a route; Mary-
land and Virginia had consented, but the president was awaiting word from Pennsyl-
vania before deciding whether to approve the commissioners' proposal. See id, For
the commissioners' report, see 1 AMERIcAN STATE PAPERS (MISC.), supra note 117, at
474-77 and 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 1001-08 (1807). A year later the president reported
further progress: Pennsylvania had consented, and Jefferson had approved the
commissioners' route "as far as Brownsville," Thomas Jefferson, Message to Congress
(Feb. 19, 1808), in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 3, at
440, with one alteration, and he had decided to preserve the trace "by opening one-
half of its breadth through its whole length," id. at 441, which is to say he had be-
gun actual construction. See 18 ANNALS OF CONG. 2746-48 (1808) and 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS (MISC.), supra note 117, at 714-15, for a description of the proposed
route. See also the commissioners' report in id. at 940-41, and 19 ANNALS OF CONG.
1784-88 (1808), for descriptions of the extension of the route to the Ohio River.
274. Thomas Jefferson, Eighth Annual Message to Congress (Nov. 8, 1808), in 1
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESDENTS, supra note 3, at 456.
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for a system of improvement, should that be thought
best. 5
This final message suggests a subtle change of emphasis not
unlike that revealed by Jefferson's private correspondence with
respect to Louisiana:.. 6 Still uncertain of existing authority, he
was beginning to acknowledge the possibility that the Constitu-
tion might not have to be amended after all.
Historians have said without documentation that, as in the
case of Louisiana, Gallatin never shared Jefferson's reservations
as to the constitutionality of federal projects for the construction
of roads and canals.7 It is certainly true that from the begin-
ning the Treasury Secretary had been an enthusiastic booster of
internal improvements. The Cumberland Road, embodied in the
ingenious bargain he designed for the Ohio Enabling Act, was
his idea." He had sold it to Giles not only as an inducement
to the state to postpone taxation of alienated public lands, but
also for the contribution it would make "toward cementing the
bonds of the Union."279
In 1807, reportedly at Gallatin's urging, Ohio Senator Thomas
Worthington persuaded the Senate to request from the Secretary
"a plan for the application of such means as are within the pow-
er of Congress, to the purposes of opening roads and making
canals .... ."o Gallatin responded a year later with a compre-
hensive report proposing a $20,000,000 plan of roads and canals
to improve communications throughout the country. While
275. Id.
276. See, e.g., supra note 144-45 and accompanying text.
277. See HENRY ADAMS, THE LIFE OF ALBERT GALLATIN 350 (Philadelphia,
Lippincott 1880); RAYIOND WALTERS, JR., ALBERT GALLATIN: JEFFERSONIAN FINAN-
CIER AND DIPLOMAT 181 (1957).
278. Letter from Albert Gallatin to William B. Giles (Feb. 13, 1802), in 1 THE
WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN, at 79 (Henry Adams ed., 1879).
279. Id.; see 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1102-03 (1802). For Gallatin's role in promoting
the Cumberland Road, see WALTERS, supra note 277, at 181-82.
280. 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 97 (1807). For a discussion of Gallatin's alleged au-
thorship of this proposal, see WALTERS, supra note 277, at 182.
281. See Report from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Senate (Apr. 6, 1808),
reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS (MISC.), supra note 117, at 724 [hereinafter
Gallatin Report]. For brief and admiring descriptions of Gallatin's plan, see ADAMS,
supra note 277, at 350-52 and WALTERS, supra note 277, at 182-84.
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he did not overtly identify any basis of congressional authority,
his observation that improvements would "facilitate commercial
and personal intercourse"282 might be an oblique reference to
the Commerce Clause, and the report itself might be understood
as an implicit assertion that the projects it proposed were "with-
in the power of Congress,"283 as the resolution had required.
Unlike Jefferson, Gallatin seemed to draw no distinction be-
tween tax revenues and land sales, presenting them as alterna-
tive sources of funding for his ambitious plan without adverting
to any constitutional question.2 Near the end of the report,
however, he did hazard one observation on the limits of congres-
sional authority:
It is evident that the United States cannot, under the
constitution, open any road or canal, without the consent of
the State through which such road or canal must pass. In
order, therefore, to remove every impediment to a national
plan of internal improvements, an amendment to the consti-
tution was suggested by the Executive when the subject was
recommended to the consideration of Congress. Until this be
obtained, the assent of the States being necessary for each
improvement, the modifications under which that assent may
be given, will necessarily control the manner of applying the
money.2s
In so saying, Gallatin seemed to imply that there was no consti-
tutional objection to federal support of internal improvements as
such, although Jefferson had pointedly argued that improve-
ments were not among the subjects to which federal revenues
could be applied.2 8
Gallatin's comments on a preliminary draft of the president's
1806 message, however, afford a somewhat different impression
of his constitutional views. Urging that Jefferson delete a hare-
282. Gallatin Report, supra note 281, at 725.
283. 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 97 (1807).
284. See Gallatin Report, supra note 281, at 740-41.
285. Id. at 741. Gallatin went on to say that because most of the projects he
proposed either had already been authorized by the states or were immediately
beneficial to them, little difficulty was to be expected on that account. See id.
286. See supra notes 265-71 and accompanying text.
1494
JEFFERSON AND THE WEST
brained passage advocating repeal of the General Welfare
Clause, 7 Gallatin first observed that
even if those words had the greatest extent in the Constitu-
tion of which they are susceptible, viz., that Congress had
power to raise taxes, &c., for every purpose which they might
consider productive of public welfare, yet that would not give
them the power to open roads and canals through the several
States.m
In light of the report that Gallatin was to file on the subject
over a year later, we can safely conclude that he was here refer-
ring to the perceived need for state consent before the federal
government itself could construct improvements.289 His letter
went on to say, however, that Jefferson's argument "that the
objects now recommended are not among those enumerated" (as
the message ultimately said) was "conclusive" and "sufficient" to
show that a constitutional amendment was in fact re-
quired29 --suggesting that at that time, at least, he agreed with
Jefferson on this point as well. Two years later, while objecting
on modern externality grounds to the president's proposal to
apportion among the states the federal funds an amendment
would make available, Gallatin added that he was "clearly of
opinion that without an amendment to the Constitution nothing
efficient can be done." 1 He may have been referring to polit-
ical rather than legal impossibility, or to his earlier insistence
on state consent to federal construction; but from all this evi-
287. Fortunately, Jefferson confined most of his wacky flights of enthusiasm to
private correspondence. For example, see his defense of Jacobin excesses in Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Jan. 3, 1793), in THOAiS JEFFERSON:
WRITINGS, at 1004 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984), where he stated that "[m]y own
affections have been deeply wounded by some of the martyrs to this cause, but rath-
er than it should have failed, I would have seen half the earth desolated." Id,; see
also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787) in id. at 91
("Calculate that one rebellion in 13 states in the course of 11 years, is but one for
each state in a century & a half. No country should be so long without one.").
288. Letter from Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 16, 1806), in 1 THE
WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN, supra note 278, at 320.
289. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
290. Letter from Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 288, at 320.
291. Letter from Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 2, 1808), in 1 THE
WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN, supra note 278, at 425.
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dence, it is not easy to be sure that Gallatin did not share
Jefferson's constitutional misgivings about federal support for
internal improvements.
In any event there were others who had no such reservations.
Avid members of Congress continued to press for particular
projects without waiting for the constitutional amendment that,
as in the case of Louisiana, was not then proposed. One of them,
at least, made the constitutional argument that was an answer
to Jefferson's doubts.292
In January 1806, shortly before Congress authorized construc-
tion of the Cumberland Road, the president and directors of the
Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Company petitioned Congress
to provide financial support for a canal to connect "the waters of
"291the Delaware and Chesapeake bays, which, as a Senate
committee concluded, would substitute "a safe inland navigation
of twenty-one miles" for "a circuitous and an exposed navigation
of five hundred."291 One month later the Kentucky legislature
filed a similar petition seeking federal support for a canal
around the rapids of the Ohio River.
295
Lauding the advantages of these projects for commerce and
national defense and emphasizing that improvement of the Ohio
River would enhance the value of unsold public lands, House
committees reluctantly concluded that it would be inexpedient to
grant the requested assistance given the parlous state of the
Treasury, but left no doubt that Congress ought to support both
projects if only it could. 296 A Senate committee, equally enthu-
siastic about the Chesapeake project, was more sanguine: "If it
be inconvenient at this moment to spare the money from the
Treasury, the United States have it in their power to contribute
the assistance prayed for by a grant of land," in exchange for
which the government would receive stock in the company.
297
292. See infra notes 302-03 and accompanying text.
293. 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 192 (1806).
294. Id. at 193.
295. See id. at 448. A Senate committee had found an earlier request to the same
effect premature, because the company had not yet been organized or chartered. See
H.R. REP. No. 8-188 (1805), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS (MISC.), supra
note 117, at 419.
296. See 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 536-37, 827-28 (1806).
297. Id. at 192, 194. The Senate apparently did not consider the Ohio rapids
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None of these committees appeared to entertain doubts as to the
authority of Congress to employ either land or tax revenues for
internal improvements, but nothing came of either request dur-
ing this session. 8
Both proposals were renewed in 1807. On January 12, one
Henry Clay of Kentucky, who had presented his credentials to
the Senate only two weeks before, 99 moved that Congress "ap-
propriate" land in support of the Ohio River project."0 Three
days later Senator Bayard's committee endorsed the previous
year's recommendation of a similar subsidy for the Chesapeake
and Delaware Canal.3'
After reprising the benefits to be derived from connecting the
Chesapeake with the Delaware, Bayard went directly to the
question of authority, noting (in obvious allusion to the
president's recent annual message) "that doubts of the highest
authority exist as to the Constitutional right of this Government
to apply the public money to objects of this kind.30 2 Bayard
himself had no doubts:
There is no express power given to erect a fort or maga-
zine, though it is recognized in the delegation of exclusive
legislative powers in certain cases. The power to erect light-
houses and piers, to survey and take the soundings on the
coast, or erect public buildings, is neither expressly given nor
recognized in the Constitution, but it is embraced by a liberal
and just interpretation of the clause in the Constitution,
which legitimates all laws necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the powers expressly delegated. On a like
principle the bank of the United States was incorporated.
Having a power to provide for the safety of commerce and the
defence of the nation, we may fairly infer a power to cut a
petition at this time.
298. See id. at 235. The negative reports were never taken up in the House, and
the Senate formally postponed consideration of its committee's favorable proposal.
299. See 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 24 (1806). Clay had been appointed in midterm to
replace John Adair, who had resigned. Born in 1777, he was younger than the Con-
stitution allowed, and he served-this time-only until 1807. See BIOGRAPImcAL DI-
RECTORY, supra note 247, at 789.
300. 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 30 (1807).
301. See id. at 34.
302. Id. at 59.
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canal, a measure unquestionably proper with a view to either
object."c
The plan before the Senate, Bayard continued, was even easi-
er to sustain; for he proposed to sell the company public land,
not to give it money from the Treasury.0 4 Congress had al-
ready conveyed land "for the endowment of schools, for the mak-
ing of roads, and [had] made gratuitous grants; and surely," he
concluded, "we must have the right to sell it for canal stock.""°5
Though he did not say so directly, his proposal comported with
the distinction drawn by Jefferson in his annual message; and
thus it was squarely supported by the precedent of the
Cumberland Road.
There were objections, but we do not know whether any of
them went to the basic question of federal authority. The Senate
voted that a bill be drafted to carry out Bayard's proposal but
then postponed it until the next session of Congress.0 6 On the
basis of another favorable committee report that sidestepped the
general constitutional issue by emphasizing that the Ohio River
project would increase the value of federal lands, the Senate
watered down Clay's parallel proposal so as to provide for the
appointment of commissioners to study various means of improv-
ing navigation at the rapids and endorsed the changes
proposed. °7 The House, however, did nothing, and both plans
303. Id.
304. See id.
305. Id.
306. See id. at 87. The Annals tell us that Adams was opposed to the proposal,
that Giles and Baldwin expressed doubts, and that the vote on Bayard's motion to
draft a bill was 20-6. See id. at 60. Apart from Senator White's reply to an un-
founded charge that the proposal was sprung upon the Senate without adequate
time for consideration, the reporter discloses neither the arguments of the three
named skeptics nor the names of the remaining dissenters. See id. at 80. Other
observers reveal that Adams branded the bill a revenue measure that ought to have
originated in the House, but there was nothing to that; the provision he had in
mind applied to taxing, not to investment. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7; 1 MEMOIRS
OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 165 at 452; PLUMER, supra note 100, at 628.
For Randolph's unconvincing assertion (in the context of a bill respecting the duty
on salt) that under the same provision the Senate could amend only the details of a
revenue bill and not the amount or subject of a tax, see 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 629
(1807); for responses, see id. at 631-35.
307. See 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 92-96 (1807); 1 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS,
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failed again.
The Senate finally passed the Chesapeake and Delaware bill
in February 1808,"'8 one month before the end of the Tenth
Congress, and of Jefferson's second term. The bill did not reach
the House floor until the last day of the session, and Virginia
Representative John Eppes moved to postpone it indefinitely,
saying it involved not only a great quantity of federal land, but
also a constitutional question that there was not sufficient time
to consider." 9 Thomas Newton, also of Virginia, protested that
Congress had settled any constitutional question when it voted
to take stock in the national bank, but that was to trivialize the
issue; it was still necessary to identify some enumerated power
to which the canal, like the bank, was necessary and proper.310
Noting the benefits of the project for national defense, North
Carolina's Richard Stanford more pertinently invoked the prece-
dent of the Cumberland Road.31' But Eppes had the votes if
not the better argument, and the bill was lost again. 12 The
Ohio River project was not heard from at all in the House.
Thus Jefferson's presidency came to an end without signifi-
cant progress on internal improvements beyond the initial steps
toward constructing the Cumberland Road. 13 Bayard's argu-
supra note 165, at 461-63.
308. See 19 ANNALS OF CONG. 341 (1808).
309. See id. at 1558.
310. See id.
311. See id. at 1560.
312. See id.
313. Not long after authorizing the Cumberland project, Congress empowered the
president to cause three other roads to be opened as well. Two of them were entire-
ly in the territories, over which Congress had broad legislative power under Article
IV, Section 3, and accordingly posed no constitutional problem. See Act of Apr. 21,
1806, ch. 41, § 7, 2 Stat. 396, 397. The third, however, was to reach from Nashville
to Natchez and thus to pass in substantial part through the state of Tennessee. See
id. Significantly, appropriations for this undertaking were to come from general
funds in the Treasury, not from the proceeds of public land sales. See ch. 41, § 8, 2
Stat. at 397. On its face, therefore, the statute. suggests that Congress may have
been unimpressed by the distinction President Jefferson would soon propose in this
regard and that it agreed with Bayard that Congress had authority to appropriate
tax revenues for improvements within the states. Nor did this statute speak of ob-
taining consent before causing the road to be opened within the state, as the
Cumberland law had demanded and as Gallatin would soon say the Constitution
required. Because there was no reported discussion of these important points, the
explanation may be that it was not actually contemplated that the United States
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ments from the commerce and war powers remained unan-
swered, and his lighthouse analogy was strong. Though Jeffer-
son professed doubts, the Republican Congress had encountered
no difficulty in continuing to finance aids to maritime naviga-
tion.3 14 The words and purpose of Article I embraced commerce
by land as well as by sea, interstate as well as foreign, and sup-
port for armies as well as navies; there was no need to rely on
the dreaded General Welfare Clause as an independent source of
congressional authority. Nor did there seem to be much to
Gallatin's more modest argument that the federal government
could not build a road or canal through a state without the
state's consent.315 Federal construction as well as federal fi-
nancing might be necessary and proper to promoting commerce
or defense, just as the Navy may build ships as well as buy
them. Any negative inference from the clause empowering Con-
gress to exercise exclusive authority over places ceded voluntari-
ly by the states had been rejected when the Army obtained West
would construct a road in Tennessee, but only extend through the Mississippi Terri-
tory existing roads already maintained by the state. See Message from Thomas Jef-
ferson to Congress (Feb. 19, 1808), in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS,
supra note 3, at 440-41.
314. See Act of Mar. 17, 1808, ch. 35, 2 Stat. 476; Act of Feb. 10, 1807, ch. 9, 2
Stat. 414; Act of Jan. 22, 1806, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 349 (repealed); Act of Mar. 26, 1804,
ch. 49, 2 Stat. 294; Act of Mar. 16, 1804, ch. 25, 2 Stat. 270; Act of Apr. 6, 1802,
ch. 20, 2 Stat. 150; see also Act of Feb. 10, 1807, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 413 (authorizing a
coastal survey, with obvious benefits for both commerce and defense). The first of
these statutes, besides providing for additional lighthouses, authorized the expendi-
ture of federal funds to construct and repair piers in the Delaware River. See ch.
20, § 8, 2 Stat. 152. In a letter to Gallatin, Jefferson protested that the Commerce
Clause no more empowered Congress to build piers than to build factories, though
the distinction seems obvious to us; "I well remember the [unreported] opposition, on
this very ground, to the first act for building a lighthouse." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (Oct. 13, 1802), microforned on Presidential Papers
Microfilm, Thomas Jefferson Papers, Series 1: Sept. 1, 1802 to Mar. 17, 1803 (Li-
brary of Congress). Apparently willing to let sleeping dogs lie, the president vetoed
none of the new lighthouses that Congress authorized, and he reconciled himself to
the pier provision by construing it to apply only to facilities for the use of warships:
"[A] power to provide and maintain a navy, is a power to provide receptacles for it
and places to cover & preserve it." Id. That was reasonable enough; it was the same
line of reasoning that justified construction of piers for merchant vessels under the
commerce power.
315. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
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Point by private purchase. 1 ' The apparent purpose of that pro-
vision was to require state consent before its authority could be
extinguished entirely. 17
Thus, even without considering the express authority to estab-
lish post roads, which Madison in an earlier exchange with the
shocked Jefferson had said included the power to build
them s a strong case could be made, and had been made, for
comprehensive federal authority over internal improvements.
The case was too strong, and the stakes were too high, for the
potential beneficiaries to give up the fight after a series of disap-
pointing failures. With a new president who had said Congress
could build roads and with the outgoing president and his influ-
ential treasury secretary firmly on record in favor of finding a
way to provide federal support for them, it was obvious the ques-
tion was not about to go away.
IV. CONCLUSION
What do the admission of Ohio, the Louisiana Purchase, and
the beginnings of the Cumberland Road teach us about the Con-
stitution and its history? Apart from specifics about the meaning
of particular constitutional provisions, at least the following:
First, they remind us once again how much significant consti-
tutional interpretation takes place outside the judicial branch.
The Court did not afr the power to acquire territory, even in
316. See CURRIE, supra note 1, at 84 n.236.
317. Jefferson himself appealed to Congress at one point to consider authorizing
him to condemn property needed for fortifications until the states could get around
to ceding it, noting that exclusive jurisdiction was not necessary to protect the
government's interests. See Thomas Jefferson, Message to Congress (Mar. 25, 1808),
in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 3, at 447; 17 ANNALS
OF CONG. 175 (1808).
318. See CURRIE, supra note 1, at 225 n.149. The Jeffersonian Congress was no-
tably reticent in the exercise of this ambiguous authority. Although Representative
Dawson twice boldly moved to employ surplus postal revenues to repair deteriorating
post roads, Congress meekly (or cheaply) prescribed that it be informed when roads
were blocked or in disrepair so it could designate others for carriage of the mail.
See 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 311 (1803); 13 id- at 554 (1803); Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch.
34, § 4, 2 Stat. 275, 277. Employment of the term "post routes" rather than "post
roads" would have made it easier to read this clause to apply to canals, to which its
purpose obviously extended.
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dictum, until 1829; ' 9 it did not clarify limits of Congress's au-
thority to impose conditions on the admission of states until
Coyle v. Smith in 1911,20 or the scope of the spending power
until United States v. Butler in 1936.21 In each case, as usual,
the relevant arguments had long since been brought out. in Con-
gress and by the Executive.
Second, these events remind us once again how many inter-
esting and important constitutional issues there are in addition
to those that dominate the agenda today-issues such as those
concerning the admission of states and the acquisition and gov-
ernment of territory-as well as how far we have departed from
earlier widespread conceptions of the limited reach of federal
authority.
Third, they introduce us (or reintroduce us) to a number of
fascinating figures: the two great former legislative leaders, Mad-
ison and Gallatin, who formed the twin bulwarks of Jefferson's
Cabinet; talented members of the House and Senate like John
Quincy Adams, James Bayard, and Wilson Cary Nicholas; and a
whole raft of lesser lights who labored diligently in Congress,
arguing forcefully and thoughtfully about the Constitution.
Finally, they give us a better understanding of Jefferson him-
self, a man much maligned by his critics but surely, by any stan-
dard, one of the great figures in American history. Yes, like the
rest of us, he had feet of clay, and not just because he may have
had a sex life or failed to practice what he preached about
slavery. More significant for present purposes are his failings as
president and statesman, not least his lamentable attack on the
independence of the judges.
When it came to westward expansion, however, Jefferson was
a man of vision. He perceived the imperative of both Louisiana
and internal improvements and, despite constitutional qualms,
he had the courage to seize the day. For Louisiana he deserves
our heartfelt thanks, not our censure.
So let us not wallow in the fact that Jefferson was less than
perfect. Let us rather rejoice at the extent to which he was able
319. See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828).
320. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
321. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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to transcend his own limitations and those of the society in
which he lived. Looking beyond his actions as president, the ac-
complishments he selected for his tombstone remind us of what
he was all about: the Declaration of Independence, the Virginia
Statute on Religious Freedom, the University of Virginia. De-
mocracy, liberty, and enlightenment-not a bad epitaph for a
man with feet of clay.
From the ankles up he's still in my Pantheon.
